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ABSTRACT 
Most of us take for granted that our body is our body. One typically experiences one’s 
body as something belonging just to oneself, as something that can only be “me”. 
However, this has poses a fundamental problem in philosophy and psychology: how do 
we know that the body is our own? It has been suggested that two distinct experiences 
of our own body help us recognize it as such: the sense of ownership, that is the 
experience that a limb is part of one’s body, and the sense of agency, that is the 
experience of being able to voluntarily control limb movement. In the present thesis we 
introduce a new version of the classical rubber hand illusion that is based on finger 
movements instead of stroking and systematically investigate how ownership and 
agency contributes to bodily self-recognition.  
 
To induce “the moving rubber hand illusion” participants control the movements of 
the index finger of a right wooden model hand in full view by moving their own right 
index finger, which is hidden from view. The illusion is quantified subjectively with 
visual analogue rating scales and behaviourally as changes in manually indicated 
sensed hand position (“proprioceptive drift”). In 9 separate experiments involving a 
total of 352 healthy volunteers we first characterized the basic constrains of the illusion. 
Secondly, we examined the relationship of ownership and agency. And finally, 
investigate a possible relationship between the illusion and individual differences in 
delusion proneness (using Peter’s Delusion Inventory).  
 
Our results show that synchronized movements of the model’s index finger and the 
participant’s index can trigger a strong illusory feeling of ownership of the model hand 
and robust experience of agency. The moving rubber hand illusion is similarly strong as 
the classical version, and follows similar temporal, spatial and anatomical rules.  
Asynchronous seen and felt finger movements, a too great distance between the real 
and model hands (≥27 cm), or the model placed in an anatomically implausible position 
abolishes the ownership-illusion.  
 
We also found that ownership and agency can be dissociated. Unlike ownership, 
agency can be experienced for the model hand when it is when placed in an 
anatomically implausible position. And ownership can be experienced irrespective of 
the hand moving actively or passively, so with or without agency. Furthermore only 
ownership, but not agency ratings correlate with the proprioceptive drift. Finally, we 
observed that delusion prone-individuals tend to give generally higher overall ratings 
on agency, when they experience the hand moved passively.  
 
Collectively, these observations advance our understanding of how ownership and 
agency contribute to bodily self-recognition. Ownership and agency constitute different 
processes: Integration of spatio-temporally congruent signals from moving limbs 
determine the sense of ownership and a match of movement intentions and feedback 
determines the sense of agency. These results offer new ways to study bodily self-
recognition both at the behavioural and neural level.  
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1 THE QUESTION OF SELF-RECOGNITION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
When we look down at our body, we always have the experience that we indeed look 
down at our body. When I am typing these words or turning the pages of this book 
when reading this thesis I experience that these are my hands in front of me. I usually 
do not question this experience. It is invariably present in every movement I make. I am 
this body and this body is me. However it is unclear how we actually come to this 
experience and a number of philosophers (like Descartes, Hume or Wittgenstein to 
name a few) throughout the centuries have puzzled over this question. So how do we 
recognize our self, how do we make the distinction between the external world and me? 
 
In recent years, the field of cognitive neuroscience has also started to adopt these 
questions and researchers started to investigate the neural and cognitive basis of this 
ability to be aware of oneself (Blanke, 2012; Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Churchland, 
2002; Damasio, 1998; Feinberg & Keenan, 2005; Jeannerod, 2003; Newen & 
Vogeley, 2003; Vogeley & Fink, 2003). Over the past few decades a plethora of 
experiments have been performed to show just how unique this ability is. One well-
known example comes from famous experiments in which a spot was placed on the 
forehead of toddlers and monkeys, and then they were placed in front of a mirror. At a 
certain age toddlers actually realize that instead of scrubbing the image in the mirror 
they should rather scrub on their own forehead to remove the dot. Non-human monkeys 
typically fail here and will continue to scrub the mirror image instead. These findings 
have been interpreted as a certain lack of self-recognition or self-awareness (Gallup, 
1970).   
Human infants seem to develop the ability to distinguish between self and external 
world very early on: another famous experiment was conducted by Bahrick and Watson 
(Bahrick & Watson, 1985) in which 5 old months toddlers were shown either live 
recordings of their own leg movements or pre-recorded and thus non-matching leg 
movements. Toddlers at that age already discriminate between the contingent and non-
contingent images. Further research explored how toddlers detect contingency of 
movement and feedback and found that this ability is present from very early on (as 
early as 6 months of age) (Rochat, 1998; Rochat & Morgan, 1995). This led some 
researchers to propose a “contingency module” in the infant brain which allows them to 
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develop self-awareness by seeking out contingent and non-contingent effects in the 
world (Gergely, 2004). In this view there should be a specific neuro-cognitive 
architecture, which is specialized in discriminating, processing, and gathering self-
related information. Whether such a self-specific neuro-cognitive architecture exists in 
the human brain is currently debated (for further discussion see Apps & Tsakiris, 2013; 
Gillihan & Farah, 2005; Legrand & Ruby, 2009; Northoff et al., 2006; Northoff, Qin, 
& Feinberg, 2011).  
 
1.2 MANY SELFS 
The term ´self´ can refer to many different things, depending on the field and purpose 
of the investigation. And unsurprisingly there are many different concepts that refer to 
what we call the self, including (but not limited to) a name, a memory, a character trait, 
and an action. 
 
In his seminal work William James (1890) already distinguishes between a physical 
self, a mental self, and a spiritual self. Neisser later proposed five different kinds of 
selves: the ecological self, interpersonal self, extended self, private self, and the 
conceptual self (Neisser, 1988). Other concepts of self have been and used by several 
authors in recent years, like the sentient self (Craig, 2010) or Damasio´s proto and 
neural self (1999) to name a few. Strawson (in Legrand and Ruby, 2009) compiled up 
to 25 different definitions of the self, which are used in various fields and concepts. 
Gillihan and Farrah (2005) in their review of the literature make a distinction between 
the physical and the psychological self and came to the conclusion that there is no 
perfectly conclusive evidence for a specific self-function in the human brain.  
 
The division between a physical and psychological self is often found in these attempts 
to conceptualize the self and seems to be useful not only to gain clarity on this matter, 
but also to define the scope of the present work. The psychological self refers to the 
personality traits of the person: the attitudes, habits, and worldviews. These are 
probably rooted in the memories and experiences accumulated over a life span that 
result in the person’s individual biography and character (Burgess, Maguire, & 
O'Keefe, 2002; Fivush, 2011). The physical self refers to our knowledge of the shape 
and look of our body - which over time can change, grow or even gets smaller, but is 
always experienced as one´s own (Ehrsson, 2012).  
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Naturally we find here some subtle differences between definitions and some of these 
different concepts resemble each other. A thorough discussion of all these concepts is 
beyond the scope of this work and in the following I narrow down the focus on the 
physical self. So the focus is on the body we have or rather the body we are, which is 
always perceived as the own body and which is distinct from other objects and persons 
in the world.  
 
1.3  THE BODILY SELF  
Recent developments in the field of philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science 
highlighted the importance of one´s body for the conscious experience of the self 
(Berlucchi & Aglioti, 1997; Chiel & Beer, 1997; Chiel, Ting, Ekeberg, & Hartmann, 
2009; Daprati, Sirigu, & Nico, 2009; S. Gallagher, 2000; 2005; Legrand & Ruby, 
2009; Tsakiris, 2010; Wilson, 2002). This is an embodied view of cognition, in which 
the physical self — so our body — is not and cannot be separated from our cognitive 
functions. In this view, the body is regarded as the fundamental basis of our cognitive 
abilities. One important factor here is the interaction with the environment, which can 
be regarded as one major, if not the major purpose of our overall cognitive architecture. 
Many of our cognitive abilities might be rooted in this interaction with the world 
(Anderson, 2003; Glenberg, 1997; O'Regan & Noe, 2001; Merlau-Ponty, 1945). 
Critically, in this view, the body not only passively receives input from the world, but 
also actively seeks out for it. Perception is then an active undertaking and one´s body is 
in constant interaction with the environment (Gibson, 1986; Noe, 2006). Several 
researchers suggested that this interaction is actually needed to “make sense” out of our 
perceptions (Gallese & Metzinger, 2003; Held & Freedman, 1963; Held & Hein, 
1963; O'Regan & Noe, 2001; Wexler & van Boxtel, 2005).  
 
However, a new problem arises here. As the body moves, it will generate new 
perceptions. For example, when I bend my wrist, I will feel stretches of the skin or 
when I walk visual information will flow onto the retina. This generates a new problem 
for our perceptual apparatus and has been subject of discussion for centuries (see for 
example Helmholtz, 1867). At the core of this problem is that our perceptions are 
partially created by us: when I lift my arm to touch an object, I create new input from 
my muscles. I flex the muscles to bend the arm, and the skin around my joints stretches. 
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If I experience these sensations without my will, it could mean that someone else grabs 
my arm. Thus, we need to be able to distinguish which of those perceptions are actually 
coming from the external world and which are produced by me (Crapse & Sommer, 
2008a,b; Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950). 
 
Therefore the problem of how we come to the experience of our own body in action 
and we perceive the constant feedback from our body (which are partially generated by 
ourselves), is important when we want to understand the process of self-recognition.  
 
1.4 OWNERSHIP AND AGENCY IN BODILY SELF-RECOGNITION 
 
So, how do we know that our physical body is my body? Gallagher (2000) proposed 
that the awareness of our self is mediated by two fundamental experiences: the 
experience of ownership and the experience of agency. The sense of ownership is the 
experience that “my body is moving regardless of whether the movement is voluntary or 
involuntary”, whereas the sense of agency represents the experience “that I am the one 
who is causing something to move” (S. Gallagher, 2000; p. 15). At any given moment 
when we move, we experience both these sensations together. However that both these 
sensations represent different aspects of the movement can be shown by passive 
movements: when someone else grabs my arm and moves it around, then I can sense 
that it is my arm being moved around, but the movement I experience is not produced 
by me, and therefore, I do not sense that I am generating this movement. Thus, I am 
lacking a sense of agency over the movement, but still experience the arm as my own 
(i.e., I still have a sense of ownership over the arm).  
 
However, in situations where we need to identify our body, we could use both these 
processes of ownership and agency to come to the conclusion that “this is my hand”.  If 
you imagine a situation where you look at a screen with a number of identical hands, 
then how would you identify the hand that is really your hand? One obvious first hint 
would be to take that hand that is closest to the position where I feel my hand to be. A 
match between the felt position of your hand and the visually observed hand can give 
rise to the feeling that this is your hand. This conclusion would be drawn on the 
congruency between different kinds of afferent information. Another way to solve this 
problem is something many people instinctively do when they, for example, discover 
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themselves on a video screen. They do a quick movement and check if the one on the 
screen is doing the same. The hand that moves in the way you move is most likely your 
hand.  
 
Both these ways of solving this problem can be translated into the framework of 
ownership and agency. To identify our own body we can rely on the match of the visual 
and somatosensory information from our body, which results in the experience of 
perceiving this hand to by my own hand (i.e., I have a sense of ownership). And we can 
rely on the feeling of being in control of the hand in question. When the hand I observe 
is under perfect control of my will, I come to the very same conclusion and identify the 
hand to be my own hand (i.e., I have a sense of agency). 
 
Investigations aiming to understand how we perceive the body as your own face a 
particular challenge: they need to be able to manipulate the perception of the own body. 
However, as William James already formulated in the 19th century: “the same old body 
(is) always there” (James, 1890, p. 260). One cannot simply study situations of not 
having a body and having a body. Some first insights into these questions have been 
made by investigating the way amputees experience their own body after the loss of a 
limb. Many amputees experience phantom limbs: that is, they still perceive the lost 
limb and some even can control movements of the absent hand or foot (Gerstmann, 
1958; James, 1887; Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998; Ramachandran & Rogers-
Ramachandran, 1996). However, an experimental tool is needed which allows a 
manipulation of these perceptions in a more controlled way. To this end researchers 
started to use various kinds of illusions that involve the body and thereby offer the 
possibility to explore the perceptual mechanisms underlying these experiences.  
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2 ON OWNERSHIP 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The rubber hand illusion represents a major breakthrough in the investigation of the 
perception of the own body. It allowed researchers to examine the experience of the 
own body in an experimental way with healthy participants, and to explore the 
perceptual rules underlying the sensation of perceiving the body as one’s own. 
Botvinick and Cohen introduced this illusion in 1998: in this illusion, a fake, but 
realistic, rubber hand is placed in front of the participant and the participant´s real hand 
is occluded from sight (see Fig. 2-1). Then, both the rubber hand and participant’s hand 
are touched simultaneously in the same place. 
When experiencing this stimulation for some 
time participants begin to feel the touch as if it 
was originating from the place where they see 
the rubber hand being touched (i.e., there is a 
referral of touch) and also feel as if the rubber 
hand becomes their own hand (i.e., there is a 
sense of ownership). Or in other words 
participants experienced the model hand to be 
their own (Botvinick, 2004; Botvinick & 
Cohen, 1998). This ground-breaking study 
showed that the sense of the body can be 
experimentally manipulated. One can induce 
this feeling of owning an artificial body part with a relatively simple procedure by 
providing visual and tactile stimulation to both hands. The simplest explanation is that 
the visual and tactile information must be bound together to overcome this initial 
conflict between the visually observed (model) hand and the felt position of 
participant´s (real) hand. This study sparkled a new interest in the perception of the 
own body and a plethora of studies investigated how and when the illusion arises 
(Ehrsson, 2012; Makin, Holmes, & Ehrsson, 2008; Tsakiris, 2010).  
 
 
Figure 2-1: Illustration of the classical 
rubber hand illusion                                   
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2.2 AT THE LEVEL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES 
The rubber hand illusion is an inherently subjective experience. Thus, the simplest way 
to experimentally quantify these experiences is to ask the participants specific questions 
regarding their experience, and let them rate the agreement or disagreement to such a 
statement on a visual-analogue scale or Likert scale. Studies commonly use two 
specific kinds of statements, which typically constitute the core of the experience in the 
rubber hand illusion: 1. The experience of ownership of the rubber hand, as if the 
rubber hand is the own hand or feels like a part of the own body (i.e. “I felt as if the 
rubber hand is my own hand”), and 2. The experience of referral of touch, as if the 
touch the participant feels originates from the place they see the rubber hand being 
touched (i.e. “I felt as if the touch I felt was caused by the brush touching the rubber 
hand”). Both these aspects of the illusory experience are commonly evaluated to 
measure the presence or absence of the illusion. The exact relationship of these two 
experiences (i.e., ownership and referral of touch) is not clear yet. It is also common 
practice also to include control statements, so statements that do not reflect the sense of 
ownership, but refer to a rather unrelated sensation (e.g., “My hand was turning 
rubbery”). This is a good way to control for task compliance or unspecific responses of 
the participants. 
 
However, more objective measurements have been introduced to register the illusion. 
Botvinick and Cohen (1998) already measured whether participants felt their real hand 
to be closer to the rubber hand during the illusion. As the participant cannot see their 
own hand they have to rely solely on the “felt” position when making judgments about 
the location of the hand. Many studies use this approach to measure the felt 
“proprioceptive drift” of the stimulated hand during the illusion (Kammers, Longo, 
Tsakiris, Dijkerman, & Haggard, 2009; Preston, 2013; Riemer, Kleinböhl, Hölzl, & 
Trojan, 2013; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005b; Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 
2007a), which has often been found to be correlated with the subjective strength of the 
illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Longo, Schüür, 
Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008). More recently, other studies have found that 
the drift might not be a specific measure of the illusion, and can be present in situations 
in which no illusion is present (Folegatti, Farnè, Salemme, & de Vignemont, 2012; 
Holle, McLatchie, Maurer, & Ward, 2011; Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006; Rohde, 
Di Luca, & Ernst, 2011). An inherent problem in comparing the drift measure across 
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studies is the exact procedure. Some studies use perceptual judgments, for which 
participants have to judge the felt position of the unseen hand in relation to a visually 
presented ruler (Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006). In other studies participants are 
instructed to point or reach to the felt position with the hand that is not stimulated 
(Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). A recent study (Riemer et al., 2013) showed that a 
perceptual judgment versus manual procedure might result in a different performance, 
making it difficult to compare results across studies. 
 
Another way to objectively measure the illusion is the skin-conductance response to a 
physical threat to the rubber hand. Here, the galvanic skin response (GSR) is measured 
with an electrode recording the conductivity of the skin that changes with sweating. 
When faced with an emotionally salient stimulus the physiological response leads to an 
increase in sweating and an increase in conductivity (Dawson et al, 2000). Armel and 
Ramachandran (2003) introduced this method by bending the rubber hand’s finger into 
anatomically impossible positions and found that participants react stronger when they 
feel ownership over the hand, as compared to control conditions (Armel & 
Ramachandran, 2003). Other studies have threatened the rubber hand with a knife or 
syringe (Ehrsson, Wiech, Weiskopf, Dolan, & Passingham, 2007; Guterstam, 
Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011). Ehrsson and colleagues (2007) found that emotional 
circuits involving the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex respond during the 
illusion when the rubber hand is threatened. This provides further evidence for a 
genuine emotional response to the rubber hand threat, when it is perceived to be part of 
the own body (Ehrsson et al., 2007).  
 
By using these different procedures to quantify the illusion a number of studies 
investigated the perceptual rules underlying the illusion (Ehrsson, 2012; Makin et al., 
2008; Tsakiris, 2010). These studies have repeatedly found that the illusion is not 
induced when the stimulation is asynchronous, so when the brush stroke on the hand 
and the visually observed brush stroke to the rubber hand do not match in time 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Shimada, Fukuda, 
& Hiraki, 2009a; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005b). Therefore the timing of the two sensory 
inputs (i.e., the touch to the real hand and the visually observed touch to the rubber 
hand) must coincide. Synchronously applied visuotactile stimulation is one crucial 
factor.  
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Also spatial factors like the distance between the participant’s hand and the rubber hand 
— which is in most cases approximately 10-15 cm — are crucial. It has been shown 
that when the distance between the two hands increases, the illusion gets weaker or 
even disappears entirely (Lloyd, 2007; Preston, 2013). Lloyd (2007) showed that by 
moving the rubber hand more than 27.5 cm away from the participant´s real hand, the 
illusion is substantially reduced (as measured by a referral of touch statement). Other 
studies did not find an effect of distance (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Zopf, 
Savage, & Williams, 2009). Furthermore Preston (2013) showed that not only the 
distance of the two hands is critical, but also the relative distance of the rubber hand to 
the body (i.e., to the trunk) affects the illusion. Therefore the exact role of distance is 
not entirely clear and the difference in results obtained so far might be influenced by 
other factors like the specific arrangement of the two hands (e.g., lateral versus distal) 
or distance to the body.  
 
Another factor is also the posture of the hand: Lloyd (2007) not only varied the distance 
(medially to the participant`s right hand), but also increasingly rotated the hand (as if 
the right hand would reach over to the left side). For example, when the posture of the 
real hand is rotated to a 90° or 180° with respect to the rubber hand the illusion is not 
evoked (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Ide, 2013; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005b). This could also 
affect the illusion, as several studies have shown that the rubber hand has to be in 
alignment with the participant´s arm, so in an anatomically plausible posture with 
respect to the participant´s arm.  
 
Based on those observations one can formulate some basic perceptual rules for the 
rubber hand illusion: (1) that the stimulation needs to occur in temporal synchronicity  
(i.e., temporal rule), and (2) that the stimulation must originate from the same region in 
space (i.e., spatial rule). These rules remind us of principles found in multisensory 
integration (Holmes & Spence, 2005; Stein & Stanford, 2008). Moreover the rubber 
hand needs to be positioned in a congruent posture (anatomical plausibility). When any 
of those principles are violated, the illusion is substantially reduced or eliminated.  
 
Other studies examined further aspects of the illusion. For example, the stimulation 
needs to occur in hand-centred reference frames. Thus the stroking direction of the two 
brush strokes should be in agreement with respect to the hands, and not in head-centred 
reference frames (Costantini & Haggard, 2007). Also, not any object can be used:  a 
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block of wood without any resemblance to a human hand or a left hand instead of a 
right hand will not elicit the illusion (Guterstam et al., 2011; Tsakiris et al., 2007a; 
Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Fotopoulou, 2010a). This is probably mediated by a top-
down knowledge about of which objects can be potentially part of the body (Tsakiris et 
al., 2010a; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005b). It shows that this process cannot be purely 
bottom-up driven by sensory input, and that certain a priori criteria need to be fulfilled 
to perceive the illusion of ownership. Surprisingly, the illusion evolves rather quickly: 
Lloyd (2007) measured the time it takes for participants to report a referral of touch 
sensation and found it takes, on average, only about 5 sec. Furthermore, Ehrsson and 
colleagues (2004) found that that the time it took for participants to indicate when they 
experienced ownership of the rubber hand was only about 11 seconds. 
 
The principles found in the rubber hand illusion have been also used in experiments to 
create new versions of illusions: the somatic rubber hand illusion, where participants 
touch a rubber hand while their own hand is touched (Ehrsson, Holmes, & 
Passingham, 2005), and the invisible hand illusion, where the empty space is touched 
while the participant is touched on the hand (Guterstam, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2013). 
Interestingly the illusion can even lead to the illusory experience of three arms 
(Ehrsson, 2009; Folegatti et al., 2012; Guterstam et al., 2011). The illusion is not 
restricted to the hand and can also be extended to the whole body making participants 
perceive a mannequin body to be their own body (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova 
et al., 2011a). These principles can be also applied to create out-of-body experiences, 
causing participants to feel relocated to a place outside their body (Ehrsson, 2007; 
Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007). Another paradigm uses the face 
watched in a mirror-like setup in which a different face is viewed and touched in 
synchrony with the own face (Tsakiris, 2008). Virtual-reality techniques have also been 
used to create bodily illusions (Perez-Marcos, Slater, & Sanchez-Vives, 2009; Slater, 
Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008; Slater, Spanlang, Sanchez-Vives, & 
Blanke, 2010). 
 
2.3 AT THE LEVEL OF BRAIN PROCESSES 
A few neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural mechanisms of the rubber 
hand illusion in the human brain. Ehrsson and colleagues (2004) used fMRI to examine 
the neural correlates of the illusion: here, the ventral premotor cortex (PMv) and the 
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intraparietal cortex (IPS) were specifically activated during the illusion, as compared to 
control conditions, in which the hand was stimulated asynchronously or the rubber 
hand was rotated. These regions are known to be involved in the processing of 
multisensory stimuli, in particular visual and tactile signals from the hand (Gentile, 
Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011; Lloyd, Shore, Spence, & Calvert, 2003). Intriguingly the 
activity of the PMv was correlated to the subjective strength of the illusion. Activations 
of the cerebellum and dorsal premotor cortex were also observed in the period before 
the illusion onset (i.e., in the phase where the potential recalibration of position sense is 
taking place).  
 
Another functional imaging study, which has investigated the neuronal mechanisms of 
the rubber hand illusion, was conducted by Tsakiris and colleagues (2007) using PET. 
They found activations of the posterior insula that showed a positive correlation with 
the proprioceptive drift measure across the conditions. The insular cortex has been 
shown to be prominently involved in aspects of interoceptive awareness like 
nociception or thermosensation (i.e., in functions related to the physiological and 
emotional regulation of the body) (Björnsdotter, Loken, Olausson, Vallbo, & 
Wessberg, 2009; Craig, 2003; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 2004; 
Löken, Wessberg, Morrison, McGlone, & Olausson, 2009; Penfield & Faulk, 1955). 
The role of the insula in body awareness has also been implicated in studies with 
neurological patients, who suffer from disorders that affect their perception of the body 
(Baier & Karnath, 2008; Karnath & Baier, 2010). 
 
A number of neuroimaging studies have shown that both the ventral premotor cortex 
and posterior parietal cortex are involved in multisensory integration, and in particular 
of visual and tactile input (Bremmer et al., 2001; Gentile et al., 2011; Lloyd et al., 
2003; Makin, Holmes, & Zohary, 2007; Schlack, Sterbing-D'Angelo, Hartung, 
Hoffmann, & Bremmer, 2005). More recently, studies have shown that both these 
structures are involved in visuotactile integration and specifically for the hand, and in 
the ownership illusion (Brozzoli, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2012; Brozzoli, Gentile, 
Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011; Gentile, Guterstam, Brozzoli, & Ehrsson, 2013). These 
studies further examined the role of the PMv and PPC and found again that the activity 
of the PMv was correlated to the subjective strength of the illusion, and the PPC 
activity was correlated to the proprioceptive drift. Therefore both these structures might 
perform different aspects within the neural processes underlying the illusion.  
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Other variations of the rubber hand illusion like the somatic rubber hand illusion 
(Ehrsson et al., 2005) or invisible hand illusion (Guterstam et al., 2013) similarly result 
in activations of a premotor-posterior parietal network. Further support for the role of 
this network in the generation of the ownership sensation comes also from the full-body 
illusion (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008). During this illusion the ventral premotor and 
posterior parietal cortex, as well as other structures like the putamen are activated 
(Petkova et al., 2011a). This network of the premotor and parietal cortex is coherent 
with findings from neurophysiological studies on multisensory integration (Graziano & 
Botvinick, 2002).  
 
2.4 AT THE LEVEL OF NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 
A key feature of the illusion is the integration of vision and touch. The merging of the 
senses (i.e., multisensory integration) has been abundantly studied with 
neurophysiological techniques, and in a variety of species, including the cat and non-
human primates (Meredith, 2002; Stein & Stanford, 2008). These studies explored the 
rules governing the responses of neurons to multisensory stimuli in various cortical 
structures like the posterior parietal and premotor cortex, and other subcortical 
structures like the putamen or superior colliculus (Duhamel, Colby, & Goldberg, 1998; 
Fogassi et al., 1996; Graziano & Gross, 1993; Graziano, Cooke, & Taylor, 2000; 
Hyvärinen, 1981; Rizzolatti, Scandolara, Matelli, & Gentilucci, 1981a; 1981b). These 
studies found that there are neurons in these regions that integrate visual and tactile 
input. So the neuron responds to a tactile stimulus to the hand, and a visual stimulus 
close to the hand. Such a bimodal neuron responds then in an additive or super-additive 
fashion. This indicates that these neurons are particularly tuned to the co-occurrence of 
both stimuli, insofar as they originate in the same region of space and occur sufficiently 
close in time (Holmes & Spence, 2005; Stein & Stanford, 2008). Importantly, the 
receptive field of such neurons moves with the body part. When the location of the 
hand changes, also the visual receptive field relocates with the hand and is then 
responsive to a stimulus close to the hand´s new position. Thus, these bimodal cells 
encode space near the body in body-part centred coordinates (Graziano, 1999; 
Graziano, Hu, & Gross, 1997). 
In sum, the principles found in these neurophysiological studies fit rather well with 
observations from the rubber hand illusion, as the illusion seems to follow perceptual 
13 
rules reminiscent of multisensory integration and draws on similar neural mechanisms 
(Brozzoli, Ehrsson, & Farnè, 2013; Ehrsson, 2012; Maravita, Spence, & Driver, 
2003). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that neurons with these features are 
involved not only in the rubber hand illusion, but also in the perception of our own 
body.  
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3 ON AGENCY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The sense of agency is difficult to define as it encompasses a variety of psychological 
aspects and mechanisms. For example, Balconi (2010) lists “awareness of a goal, of an 
intention to act, and initiation of action, as well as awareness of movements, sense of 
activity, sense of mental efforts, sense of control, and the concept of authorship” (p. 3) 
as putative components of the sense of agency. All these different aspects contribute to 
our experience of agency, when we perform an action. Unsurprisingly the literature on 
the sense of agency includes a variety of observations and theoretical frameworks and 
often relates to other questions like the nature of free will (Haggard, 2008; Hallett, 
2007; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008b; Wegner, 2003) 
 
In a broader view, the sense of agency can be used as a means to answer the question 
“was that event generated by myself or by someone else in the world”? The 
environment around us is usually not static, but constantly changes and provides 
endless sets of new sensory information. Some of these changes are changes caused by 
myself, as I move and act in the environment. Therefore the ability to classify whether 
these changes are actually caused or someone else is important. Helmholtz elaborated 
on this problem already in 19th century by discussing the observation that when the 
eyeball is moved passively, the image on the retina actually jumps. However we do not 
perceive this when we normally move the eyes (Helmholtz, 1867). Therefore the 
information from the eye must be somehow adjusted to the upcoming eye movement, 
so we know that these changes on the retina are changes that are a direct result of my 
movement and not from the outside world. This in principal must not only apply to the 
eye, but to our whole body.  
 
Later, in the 1950s von Holst & Mittelstädt (1950) and Roger Sperry (1950) re-
approached this problem from a more biological perspective. They suggested that a 
copy of the motor commands (i.e., efference copy) entailing the expected sensory 
changes could be used to classify perceptions into input that is the result of the own 
action (i.e., re-afference) or an input that originated from the external world (i.e., ex-
afference) (Bell, 1981; Crapse & Sommer, 2008a,b; Holst & Mittelstädt, 1950; 
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Sommer & Wurtz, 2002; Sperry, 1950). This provides a key mechanism that can 
discriminate between sensations generated by me and by someone or something else. 
 
3.2 AT THE LEVEL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES 
A key factor in the sense of agency is the congruency between an action and its 
feedback, so the anticipated outcome compared to the actual outcome. Therefore, many 
studies investigating the sense of agency typically manipulate the feedback (i.e., visual 
or auditory feedback) of an action (Balslev, Cole, & Miall, 2007; Daprati et al., 1997; 
de Vignemont & Fourneret, 2004; Farrer, Bouchereau, Jeannerod, & Franck, 2008a; 
Franck et al., 2001; Haggard & Chambon, 2012; T. I. Nielsen, 1963; Preston & 
Newport, 2010; Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Tsakiris, Haggard, Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu, 
2005). For example, when the delay between a button press and a subsequent tone 
increases, the participant´s sense of having caused this tone gradually decreases. A 
reduction in the sense of agency is also observed when the tone has a different 
frequency than the tone anticipated by the participant (Sato & Yasuda, 2005). In 
addition to temporal deviations, also spatial deviations have also been found to alter the 
sense of agency. For example, when the visual feedback of a cursor or joystick 
movement is spatially distorted, then similar a reduction of agency is observed (Farrer, 
Bouchereau, Jeannerod, & Franck, 2008a; Franck et al., 2001). Studies investigating 
the spatiotemporal rules of the sense of agency have found that the threshold at which 
we still experience an action as our action is a temporal delay of ~150 ms and a spatial 
deviation of 15-20°. Beyond these discrepancies participants begin to judge the 
feedback to be inaccurate with regard to their expectations (Jeannerod, 2003; Shimada 
et al., 2009a).  
 
One very influential account of these observations is based on the framework of motor 
control (Bays & Wolpert, 2006; Franklin & Wolpert, 2011; Wolpert, 1997; Wolpert 
& Ghahramani, 2000). To achieve accurate control the motor system does not only use 
sensory feedback, but also uses predictions (i.e., forward models), which are compared 
to the actual feedback. A discrepant feedback would signal to the motor system the 
necessity to monitor and correct the movement accordingly. Indeed, the role of these 
predictive processes in motor control has been shown in a variety of tasks (Bays, 
Wolpert, & Flanagan, 2005; Desmurget & Grafton, 2000; Flanagan, Vetter, 
Johansson, & Wolpert, 2003; Johansson & Flanagan, 2009; Shergill, Bays, Frith, & 
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Wolpert, 2003). These efference copy mechanisms might also be the basis for the 
psychological experience of agency (Blakemore & Frith, 2003; Blakemore, Wolpert, 
& Frith, 2002; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000b; Haggard, 2005). However, it has 
been found that this framework cannot fully explain all observations of the sense of 
agency. Several studies found that in some circumstances participants can perceive 
agency even in cases of rather large spatiotemporal discrepancies (Fourneret & 
Jeannerod, 1998; Nielsen, 1963; Preston & Newport, 2010). 
 
This led some researchers to suggest that our experience of actions does not just depend 
on the exact sensorimotor contingencies, but also on a more general congruency 
between intention and actions (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2002). And 
indeed this account can explain some observations in which participants experience a 
sense of agency when the action is actually not causally linked to that stimulus. For 
example, Wegner and colleagues (2004) presented participants auditory primes via 
headphones while they saw the outstretched arms of the experimenter (standing behind 
them) sticking out in the front of the participant. The experimenter then executed 
actions (like wave your hand) while the participants heard the same word. When the 
word and the observed action are congruent, then participants actually feel to have 
caused those arms to move the way they moved (Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 
2004). In these cases the experience of agency cannot be derived from sensorimotor 
contingencies or any feeling of doing and must be therefore inferred from other non-
sensorimotor cues. 
 
A fundamental problem in the sense of agency literature is the heterogeneity of the 
experimental approaches (David, 2012; David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008; S. 
Gallagher, 2012; Haggard & Chambon, 2012; Jeannerod, 2003). Gallagher (2007) 
pointed that authors are often conceptually unclear about what exactly they are 
referring to when they manipulate agency. Depending on the actual task demands (i.e., 
judgement of feedback from hand movements versus cursor movements) agency might 
be perceived differently and might be judged on the basis of different kinds of 
information (Farrer, Valentin, & Hupé, 2013; Preston & Newport, 2010; Sato, 2009; 
Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a; Yomogida et al., 2010). The question whether 
agency is based on sensorimotor contingencies or mere intention is one reason for the 
heterogeneity in the literature (S. Gallagher, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 
2008a; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005a). Tsakiris and Haggard (2005a) pointed out that in 
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essentially all agency paradigms the participant needs to move. Thus sensorimotor 
contingencies are always present, and it is difficult to isolate the contribution of afferent 
and efferent information in the experience of an action.  
 
One way to reconcile these different observations is to distinguish between different 
levels of agency. Several distinctions have been proposed, such as pre-reflective versus 
reflective agency (S. Gallagher, 2012), implicit versus explicit agency (Moore, 
Middleton, Haggard, & Fletcher, 2012), or feelings versus judgements of agency 
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a). At the core of these distinctions is the idea 
that agency cannot be only derived from sensorimotor contingencies, but also from 
environmental or contextual cues. Therefore one must consider a multifactorial process 
in the sense of agency, so that agency can arise by sensorimotor contingencies weighted 
against contextual information. When contextual information or the intention to achieve 
a certain goal is valued higher, then sensorimotor discrepancies can be disregarded and 
participants still perceive agency by integrating these other cues (Farrer et al., 2013; J. 
Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009; Sato, 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 
2008a). 
 
An inherent difficulty in investigating the sense of agency is to find an objective way to 
measure it. An interesting phenomenon, which has been suggested to be an implicit 
measure of the agency experience, is the so-called temporal binding effect (Haggard, 
Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Moore & Obhi, 2012). When participants judge the onset of 
their action and the subsequent result (e.g., a beep tone), then these judgements are 
temporally biased such that the action seems to occur later than it actually did and the 
beep tone to occur earlier than it actually did. In this way, the action and the tone 
appear to be closer together in time, as if the participants experience those two events to 
be temporally bound (Moore & Obhi, 2012). This temporal binding is specific to 
voluntary actions, and does not occur during passive movements. This is consistent 
with the idea that this phenomenon is related to the sense of agency. 
 
3.3 AT THE LEVEL OF BRAIN PROCESSES 
Given the variety of concepts and components I have described above, it is not 
surprising that there a number of different brain areas that have been found to be 
involved in the sense of agency (David et al., 2008). Among these, I will highlight a 
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few structures that are repeatedly observed in agency paradigms. These seem to be 
related to key aspects of the sense of agency like movement intention and processing of 
sensory feedback.  
 
One highly relevant structure is the supplementary motor area (SMA) (Picard & Strick, 
2001). The SMA is critically involved in the initiation of an action, or the intentional 
aspect of the action (Eccles, 1982; G. Goldberg, 1985; Jahanshahi, Jenkins, Brown, & 
Marsden, 1995; Jenkins, Jahanshahi, Jueptner, Passingham, & Brooks, 2000; Lau, 
Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham, 2004; Roland, Skinhøj, Lassen, & Larsen, 1980). 
Activation of the SMA has also been observed when comparing active and passive 
movements (Mima et al., 1999; Weiller et al., 1996), which is an elegant way to 
differentiate between afferent and efferent components (Cullen, 2004). These studies 
show, among others, activation of the SMA in active movements.  Studies on voluntary 
movement execution using other techniques like electroencephalography (EEG) have 
also shown heightened activity localized to frontal midline structures around the SMA 
(Haggard, 2008; Hallett, 2007; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983).  
 
Another important cortical structure is the posterior parietal cortex, which is known to 
be involved in a variety of tasks related to visuomotor and visuospatial transformations 
(Culham & Valyear, 2006; Fogassi et al., 2005). Studies making use of a mismatch 
detection task have repeatedly shown that increasing sensorimotor discrepancy (i.e. the 
visual feedback is delayed with respect to the actual movement) is associated with 
increasing activity in the inferior parietal cortex, and in particular angular gyrus 
(Balslev, Nielsen, Paulson, & Law, 2005; Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer, Frey, Van Horn, 
Tunik, Turk, et al., 2008b; Nahab et al., 2011). Thus, this structure seems to be 
important in the detection of such sensory mismatches, and might also mediate between 
conflicting sensory input (Hagura et al., 2007).  
 
Similar to the posterior parietal cortex, the cerebellum has been implied in the 
processing of sensory feedback (Blakemore & Sirigu, 2003; Manto et al., 2011). In a 
series of experiments Blakemore and colleagues tested how participants perceived self-
produced stimuli, which are perceived to be weaker than externally produced stimuli 
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000b). This is nicely exemplified by the famous 
question, “why I cannot tickle myself” (Weiskrantz & Elliott, 1971). These 
experiments suggested that the cerebellum is involved in the sensory predictive process 
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resulting in the cancellation of self-produced stimuli (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 
2001; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998). Together, these and other studies show that 
the cerebellum is involved in the predictive component in motor control (Ebner & 
Pasalar, 2008). 
 
Most agency studies make use of a mismatch detection paradigm and measure the 
neural responses as the discrepancy between movement and feedback increases. 
However, this leads us to a conceptual problem: these brain areas signal the increasing 
discrepancy (Nahab et al., 2011), and are therefore active when in fact the participant 
does not feel agency. An exception to this is a study by Farrer and Frith (2003), in 
which they investigated not only the neural responses for increasing discrepancy 
(leading to activation of the inferior parietal cortex), but also for congruent feedback, so 
(i.e., for those movements where participants so feel agency). They found that when 
participants experience temporally congruent feedback, the activity in the right 
posterior insula was increased.  
 
3.4 AT THE LEVEL OF NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 
Electrophysiological studies in the monkey brain have investigated various aspects of 
sensorimotor control that are relevant for the sense of agency. These studies confirm 
the role of the SMA in movement initiation. The function of the SMA became clearer, 
when studies examined the specific role of neurons in different locations of the medial 
motor areas (Picard & Strick, 1996). The medial motor region consists of a number 
different motor areas, most notably of the SMA-proper and pre-SMA (Geyer, Matelli, 
Luppino, & Zilles, 2000; Luppino & Rizzolatti, 2000). Whereas the SMA-proper 
shows corticospinal projections and is densely connected to other premotor areas, the 
pre-SMA is more connected to prefrontal areas (Mitz & Wise, 1987; Picard & Strick, 
1996; Tanji & Kurata, 1979). This difference in connectivity also illustrates the 
different functional roles in motor tasks. The SMA-proper is more related to the 
execution of movement and the pre-SMA is more related to the initial planning of 
movements (Hoshi & Tanji, 2004).  
 
Neurons in the posterior parietal cortex are involved in a variety of motor or 
visuomotor related tasks (Andersen & Cui, 2009; Cooke, Taylor, Moore, & Graziano, 
2003; Hyvärinen, 1982). Andersen and colleagues studied neurons in the parietal 
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cortex and their role for saccades and eye movement control. They found neurons in the 
posterior parietal cortex encode the upcoming saccades, thus which movement is 
intended to be executed next. This has been interpreted in a way that neurons in this 
area form intentional maps (Andersen & Buneo, 2002; Snyder, Batista, & Andersen, 
1997).  
 
A role of the PPC for movement intention has also been suggested by a study with 
brain surgery patients. Desmurget and colleagues (2009) electrically stimulated the 
ventral premotor and inferior parietal cortex, while at the same time measuring the 
electromygraphic (EMG) activity of a number of muscle groups. Interestingly, while 
stimulation of the premotor cortex led to contractions of muscles, patients did not report 
the sensation of having caused these movements. In contrast, stimulation of the inferior 
parietal cortex did not result in muscle activity, but patients reported having the urge to 
move (or claimed to have moved) (Desmurget et al., 2009). Already Wilder Penfield in 
his pioneering studies reported that electrical stimulation of the cortical surface can 
induce the urge to move or sensations of having moved, but he found similar responses 
rather after stimulation of precentral areas (Penfield, 1954; Penfield & Boldrey, 1937).  
 
Although, I have mostly emphasised here cortical structures for movement initiation 
also sub-cortical structures (e.g., basal ganglia) have also been found to be important in 
the voluntary generation of movements (Grillner, Hellgren, Ménard, Saitoh, & 
Wikström, 2005; Penfield, 1954). The basal ganglia are connected to the SMA, but 
also to the parietal cortex and the cerebellum, and therefore play an important role in 
motor control (Akkal, Dum, & Strick, 2007; Clower, Dum, & Strick, 2005; Graybiel, 
2005; Hoshi, Tremblay, Féger, Carras, & Strick, 2005). All those different structures 
typically implied in the sense of agency (i.e., SMA, PPC, Cerebellum) are functionally 
and anatomically linked, thereby building a densely connected network involved in 
motor control (Dum & Strick, 2005; Grefkes & Fink, 2005; Luppino & Rizzolatti, 
2000; Ramnani, 2006; Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001).  
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4 SELF-RECOGNITION, OWNERSHIP AND AGENCY 
  
4.1 SELF-RECOGNITION OR OWNERSHIP OR AGENCY  
Given the variety in concepts of self or self-recognition, it is not surprising that the 
literature appears rather heterogeneous. Studies often use very different concepts and 
apply different tasks to explore the mechanisms involved in self-recognition.  
 
4.1.1 The problem of self-recognition 
Many studies investigating self-recognition use pictures or other stimuli related to the 
person, and the participant has to judge whether this stimuli can be attributed to him or 
herself (e.g., a picture of the participant). Several authors criticised that the recognition 
on screens, pictures, and mirrors (i.e., in the aforementioned study by Gallup, 1970) is 
falsely taken as evidence for self-awareness or self-recognition and that extrapolation 
from one medium to another (e.g., mirror to video) is problematic. Familiarity with the 
medium might affect the performance in such a task (Heyes, 1995; Suddendorf & 
Butler, 2013). Therefore, with studies using these kinds of media it is not certain 
whether the performance is an artefact of the technique used. 
 
Furthermore, Legrand and Ruby (2009) argued that studies using self-related stimuli 
never actually tap into self-specific mechanisms. These might refer to the identity or 
personality to the person, but “none of these contents can be considered intrinsically 
self-specific: They do not meet the criterion of exclusivity” (p. 272). These stimuli are 
not exclusive as many people can have black hair or be shy, but that does not mean that 
having black hair or being shy is unique to this individual. Interestingly, the authors 
suggest that the feeling or experience of the own body could be regarded as one of a 
few instances that are exclusively and specifically related to the self. No one can 
experience my body the way I experience it.  
 
A critical factor here might be the perspective. Most often stimuli are viewed from a 
third-person perspective. However we perceive our self always from the first-person 
perspective, so from “within”. This perspective constitutes the basis of our self-
experience (Legrand & Ruby, 2009; Vogeley & Fink, 2003). In line with this it has 
been shown that this first-person perspective is crucial to induce illusions like the full-
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body illusion, in which participants perceive a mannequin’s body as their own body. 
When the perspective changes, so participants view the body from a third-person 
perspective, the illusion is significantly reduced (Petkova et al., 2011a; Petkova, 
Khoshnevis, & Ehrsson, 2011b).  
 
Recent technological developments in video technology, for example head – mounted 
displays (Petkova et al., 2011a; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008), high-performance video 
systems  (Newport, Pearce, & Preston, 2010; Preston & Newport, 2010), and virtual-
reality techniques (Perez-Marcos et al., 2009; Sanchez-Vives, Spanlang, Frisoli, 
Bergamasco, & Slater, 2010; Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2009) 
can overcome some of these aspects by generating a more natural first person-
experience and induce a realistic and “immersive” experience (Slater, 2009). Still one 
has to take into account that neuro-cognitive mechanisms might respond differently to 
virtual or real stimuli (Perani et al., 2001; Snow et al., 2011). This applies also to 
paradigms like the rubber hand illusion. It has been found that the illusion is weaker 
when not a real, but projected or video-based hand image is used instead (Ijsselsteijn, 
de Kort, & Haans, 2005) 
 
In sum, one should carefully distinguish between (visual) self-recognition paradigms 
using pictures, mirrors or video images and paradigms like the rubber hand illusion that 
involves a somatic experience of the rubber hand being part of the own body. Self-
recognition here is a result of a different set of mechanisms and factors related to the 
feeling of ownership, which are not necessarily implied in other self-recognition 
paradigms.  
 
4.1.2 Agency with or without ownership 
Many studies use a mismatch detection paradigm, in which the image of the hand is 
displayed on a screen and the spatiotemporal characteristics of the hand movement are 
manipulated (Daprati et al., 1997; Nahab et al., 2011; Tsakiris et al., 2005). These 
implicitly assume that this will make the task more self-specific, as if it is the 
participant´s own hand. However, in some of these cases it can be questioned whether 
this really involves the bodily experience of ownership, like in the rubber hand illusion. 
Sometimes the assumption of measuring agency specific to the own hand is more 
implicit (e.g., Nahab and colleagues (2011) aiming to “characterize the neural 
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mechanisms underlying self-agency”) or explicitly assumed (e.g., Shimada and 
colleagues (2009) who argue that they “can consider that the subject would feel the 
sense of ownership”). Often this question is actually not raised at all.  Sometimes it is 
even likely that the participants might experience body ownership due to the specific 
arrangement of the experiment resulting in a match of the visually observed hand and 
felt position of the participant´s hand, e.g., in Farrer and Frith (2003). Many of these 
studies do not clearly operationalize ownership and agency in a way that allows 
measuring their individual contribution to the self-recognition task.   
 
Even when these studies consider ownership and agency, they might tap into a new 
problem. As pointed out by Tsakiris and colleagues (2007a) in any observation in these 
paradigms it might not be possible to clearly identify which aspect – ownership or 
agency – actually contributes to the self-recognition judgment. A mismatch between 
the own action and the observed hand will cause two different types of error signals: an 
error signal indicating that there is a violation of the prediction (i.e., the observed hand 
is not moving as it was predicted = motor prediction error = agency error), but also a 
mismatch between the felt position of the hand and the visually displayed hand (i.e., the 
observed hand is not at the position I sense it = intersensory error = ownership error). 
Both these errors will indicate that the observed hand is not the own hand (Tsakiris, 
Longo, & Haggard, 2010b; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007b). 
 
Following this line of thought we have to conclude that any self-recognition judgment 
in a broader sense could be based on either ownership or agency related cues. Vice 
versa we have also to conclude that when a participant shows an abnormal performance 
in a self-recognition task (i.e., falsely identifying the observed hand as the own despite 
gross mismatches), we cannot be sure where the actual disturbance comes from: from 
faulty agency or from faulty ownership cues. Both can be interpreted as errors in self-
recognition. 
 
4.2 SELF-RECOGNITION IN NEUROLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRICAL 
POPULATIONS 
 
The aforementioned problem applies also to observations in clinical populations. 
Altered perceptions of the body have been discussed from the very beginning of 
modern psychology and neurology (Bonnier, 1905 (2009); Gerstmann, 1927; Pick, 
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1922; Smythies, 1953; Zingerle, 1913). These disturbances can affect various aspects 
of the perception of the own body resulting in a variety of sometimes bizarre symptoms 
reported by patients (Corradi-Dell'Acqua & Rumiati, 2007; de Vignemont, 2009; 
Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). Some of these syndromes are of particular interest as they 
might reflect a disorder of the sense of ownership and / or agency.  
 
A prominent example for a disorder affecting self-recognition is schizophrenia, for 
which altered experience of the self and self-recognition are hallmarks of the disorder 
(Hur, Kwon, Lee, & Park, 2013; Jeannerod, 2009; Nelson et al., 2009; Parnas, 2005; 
Waters & Badcock, 2010). For a long time it is believed that many of these symptoms 
can be summarized under agency failures rooted in dysfunctional comparator 
mechanisms (Feinberg, 1978; Frith, 1996; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000a), 
despite the fact that schizophrenic patients often exhibiting a variety of abnormal 
perceptions of their own body that are unrelated to the sense of agency (Cleveland, 
Fisher, Reitman, & Rothaus, 1962; Fisher, 1964; Gerstmann, 1958; Priebe & 
Röhricht, 2001; Röhricht & Priebe, 1997). Nevertheless, in line with the idea of an 
abnormal sense of agency and faulty efference copy mechanisms studies using 
mismatch detection paradigms have found that schizophrenic patients are not as 
sensitive for temporal delays or spatial deviations as healthy participants (Daprati et al., 
1997; Farrer et al., 2004; Franck et al., 2001). They also show abnormal sensory 
predictions (Blakemore, Smith, Steel, Johnstone, & Frith, 2000a; Shergill, Samson, 
Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2005).  
 
Given the intimate linkage between agency and ownership in voluntary movements the 
questions arises as to whether schizophrenia must be understood solely as a disorder of 
agency and whether the pathology affects self-processing in broader way (Parnas, 
2005; Raballo, Saebye, & Parnas, 2011). As pointed out by Waters and Badcock 
(2011) a self-attribution deficit (as observed in these mismatch detection paradigms, see 
e.g., Daprati et al., 1997) can be rooted not only in an agency problem (or motor 
prediction error, see also Tsakiris et al. 2007a), but “may also reflect a disturbance in 
body ownership” (p. 513). Indeed studies using the rubber hand illusion paradigm 
suggest that schizophrenic patients show abnormal ownership experiences. These 
patients show an abnormally strong illusion with a much faster onset of the illusion 
(Peled, Pressman, Geva, & Modai, 2003; Peled, Ritsner, Hirschmann, Geva, & 
Modai, 2000; Thakkar, Nichols, McIntosh, & Park, 2011).  
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It seems that abnormal experiences in the rubber hand illusion might not be limited to 
clinically diagnosed schizophrenia. Abnormal experiences can be already observed at 
an earlier stage, when individuals might carry certain tendencies for delusional ideation 
(Germine, Benson, Cohen, & Hooker, 2012). Such tendencies for delusional beliefs 
might be not specific to a clinically manifest psychosis, but can be found as a trait also 
within the general healthy population (Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999; Peters, Joseph, 
Day, & Garety, 2004; Van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 
2008). Crucially, individuals on the high end of this spectrum can be characterized by 
similar thought and perceptual processes as psychotic patients (Fusar-Poli et al., 2012; 
Schmack et al., 2013; Teufel, Kingdon, Ingram, Wolpert, & Fletcher, 2010). They 
also show higher risk for a clinically manifest psychotic disorder (Fusar-Poli et al., 
2013). Therefore delusion-prone individuals might already show certain abnormal 
tendencies in the way they perceive their own movements. Given that these alterations 
do not manifest themselves in a pathological way, these changes in perception and 
cognition are rather subtle.   
 
A way to quantify these tendencies however is the questionnaire of Peters and 
colleagues (Peters et al., 2004; 1999), which is an acknowledged screening inventory 
to test for the presence of delusion. It consists of 21 items that are rated for the presence 
of delusions and other factors like distress-level. By using this inventory it has been 
indeed shown that delusional tendencies are presence in the healthy population. It has 
also been shown that these ratings directly relate to performance levels in perceptual 
and motor tasks (Schmack et al., 2013; Teufel et al., 2010).  
 
Other neurological syndromes like asomatognosia or anosognosia for hemiplegia are 
neurological disorders occurring often after stroke that affect more distinctly the sense 
of ownership or agency respectively. Asomatognosia reflects a syndrome in which 
patients believe that their limb is no longer part of their own body. This occurs often 
after lesions of the parieto-temporal or fronto-parietal cortex, but also insula cortex of 
the right hemisphere (Arzy, Overney, & Landis, 2006; Baier & Karnath, 2008; 
Feinberg & Haber, 1990). When the doctor holds up their hand in front of them, these 
patients deny that the hand they see is actually their own hand (Wortis & Dattner, 
1942). In anosognosia for hemiplegia patients deny their hemiplegia. Thus despite the 
obvious deficit of being paralyzed these patients are not aware of their disorder. This 
is often seen after right hemisphere lesions involving fronto-parietal structures or 
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other structures like the insula or thalamus (Berti et al., 2005; Gerstmann, 1942; 
Karnath, Baier, & Nägele, 2005; Orfei et al., 2007). It has been suggested that this 
disorder can be placed into the spectrum of agency related mechanisms, where the 
brain damage leads to a dysfunctional motor system. This makes the patient unable to 
accurately monitor their actions (Fotopoulou et al., 2008; Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 
2010).  
 
Often the concepts of ownership and agency, and with this the syndromes of 
asomatognosia and anosognosia, are confused in the literature. This makes it difficult 
to infer the underlying mechanisms responsible for the pathology (Synofzik, 
Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008b). For example, Dieguez and colleagues (2007) “use the 
term asomatognosia as the general heading for the disorders of bodily awareness, 
where one´s body may be perceived in an unusual manner, or not perceived as having 
changed in its function”. This definition seems to entail two different aspects: the 
former seems to relate to issues of asomatognosia (so, more ownership related) and 
the latter to anosognosia (so, more agency related) aspects.  Partially this is rooted in 
the obvious problem that brain lesions after stroke usually damage wide cortical 
territories including the underlying white matter structure and can therefore lead to a 
variety of neurological symptoms co-occurring in the same patient (like neglect). In 
particular it has been shown that anosognosia is often confounded with a loss of 
ownership for the affected limb at the same time (Baier & Karnath, 2008; Feinberg & 
Roane, 2000).   
 
4.3 A SHORT NOMENCLATURE 
 
Before we continue it might be helpful to clarify the use of the terms of self-
recognition, ownership and agency in the present thesis: 
Bodily self-recognition is used here as a term to describe mechanisms, which enable 
us to identify our own body as something different than the environment. It refers the 
immediate and momentary feeling of perceiving the body as my body. In this way 
self-recognition is not only a question related to bodily awareness or consciousness, 
but becomes also a distinct perceptual problem. We do not include aspects related to 
the psychological self or to visual recognition like on pictures.  
 
Bodily self-recognition entails ownership and agency as two different, but 
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complementary aspects. Both can contribute to bodily self-recognition and can 
identify the body as one’s own. Agency refers here to the sense of authorship, so the 
sense to be able to control and move the body voluntarily. Ownership refers to the 
experience of perceiving a body part as the own body part. Given this definition both 
these experiences represent different aspects of the movement, but they are often 
experienced in tight conjunction with each other. This poses a problem when 
experimentally probing these processes.  
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5 THE MOVING RUBBER HAND ILLUSION 
The rubber hand illusion undoubtedly represents a major breakthrough in the 
investigation of the mechanisms underlying the perception of the own body (Botvinick, 
2004; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). However, as pointed out by Tsakiris and colleagues 
(2007b) the rubber hand illusion “lacks ecological validity, mainly because it does not 
involve bodily movement” (p. 650). The participant does not move during the 
experiment and the rubber hand always remains static. Therefore, the classical version 
lacks the dimension of action and agency. This is important, as we mainly perceive our 
own body during movements. We constantly use our body to walk, run, and reach for 
the things around us. This ability to control our body is a major source of information 
for the experience of the body. To fully understand the mechanisms of bodily self-
recognition, in which both the sense of ownership for the body and the sense of agency 
over its movements take part, we need to be able to examine both these aspects more 
directly (S. Gallagher, 2000; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005a; van den Bos & Jeannerod, 
2002; Jeannerod, 2006),  
 
A few studies directly investigated this question by inducing the illusion with 
movements instead.  The first study has been conducted by Tsakiris and colleagues 
(2006). Participants experienced active movements, passive movements, and 
visuotactile stimulation while seeing a projected image of their own hand. Their hand 
was occluded from view and recorded with a video camera system. When measuring 
the proprioceptive drift they found no difference in the strength of the drift between the 
three conditions. However, they found a difference in how the feeling of drift spread 
over the rest of the hand. After active movements the proprioceptive drift spread across 
the hand and included other fingers (so, when the index finger moved and the little 
finger had to be localized). When the illusion was induced by passive movements or 
visuotactile stimulation, then the drift was restricted to the stimulated finger only, as if 
the drift stays localized. However, no subjective reports on the feeling of ownership 
and agency were collected in this study. 
 
Dummer and colleagues (2009) used a different setup, in which not the individual 
fingers, but the whole hand is mechanically moved either in synchrony or asynchrony 
with respect to their own movement. They found a tendency for stronger illusion in the 
29 
active movements than in passive movements, but the illusion in the active condition 
not to be stronger in the visuotactile condition. The experiment was based on 
questionnaire ratings regarding the sense of ownership, but not agency, and an 
objective measure was not applied (Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009) . 
 
Longo and Haggard (2009) used a video screen based setup to test whether the feeling 
of ownership and / or agency would facilitate the reaction time to a visual stimulus 
given close to the hand. They tested active movements, passive movements and 
visuotactile stimulation. They found that reaction times were facilitated when 
ownership and agency were experienced. They also reported a main effect of induction 
type (i.e., the strength of the illusion differed in the three versions) (Longo & Haggard, 
2009).  
 
More recently Walsh and colleagues (2011) tested whether the illusion can still be 
induced under anaesthesia of the skin, thus removing certain sensory components 
normally stimulated in the illusion. Still in this situation without somatosensory 
feedback from the superficial skin the illusion can be induced. Surprisingly they found 
a stronger illusion in the passive movement condition, and also a stronger illusion in the 
anesthetized conditions than in the non - anesthetized conditions (Walsh, Moseley, 
Taylor, & Gandevia, 2011). 
 
In sum, the literature of the rubber hand illusion induced by movements appears rather 
heterogeneous, making it difficult to conclude whether the illusion by movements 
differs to the classical version of this experiment or not. And if so, how it exactly 
differs. This is partly related to the differing procedures to induce the illusion (finger 
movements versus whole hand movements), the setup used (video-screen versus real 
hand) and differing approaches used to quantify the illusion (subjective reports and / or 
proprioceptive drift with differing measurement procedures). Partly these studies also 
aimed to answer slightly different questions, and were not primarily interested in the 
relationship of ownership and agency.  
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5.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESENT WORK 
The present work is motivated by the idea to develop a rubber hand illusion paradigm 
based on movements and with high ecological validity by using a real model hand.  
This inclusion of movements allows a systematic investigation of ownership and 
agency within a single experiment. This will help us to understand the processes 
underlying the perception of ownership and agency and their individual contribution to 
the process of bodily self-recognition.  
 
For this purpose we examined whether… 
 
• … Movements can produce a strong ownership illusion and experience of 
agency in a rubber hand illusion paradigm. 
• … The moving rubber hand illusion obeys similar perceptual rules as the 
classical illusion. 
• … The moving rubber hand illusion differs from the classical illusion. 
• …. The moving rubber hand illusion can be used as an experimental model to 
investigate psychiatric traits in relation to bodily self-recognition. 
 
5.2 METHODS 
5.2.1 The setup 
The moving rubber hand consists of a wooden model hand (right hand) with movable 
finger joints that has the size of an average adult hand. The length is 20 cm (wrist – 
large finger tip) and width is 10 cm (thumb – little finger). The hand is placed on a 
wooden box with the measures of 20 x 30 x 12 cm. Therefore, the distance between the 
participant´s hand and the model hand is 12 cm, which is in the typical range of rubber 
hand illusion experiments. The model hand is covered with a latex glove. In the 
experiments the participant wore an identical glove on the right hand.  
 
The box is placed on a table at a distance 50 cm from the participant, so that the 
participant can rest the whole forearm on the table. The participant´s right arm is 
covered with an opaque cloth to prevent sight of the own body (see Fig. 5-1). A light 
stick connected to plastic rings worn on the distal finger joint, and connected both the 
participant´s index finger and the model hand´s index finger.  
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As can be seen in Fig. 5.1, the model hand is placed on top of the box, thus above the 
participant´s hand. This vertical arrangement deviates from the initial setup introduced 
by Botvinick and Cohen (1998), in which both hands are place side by side in the 
horizontal plane, and which is the most common way used in rubber hand illusion 
studies. However, a number of studies have also used also this vertical arrangement and 
shown that also when placing the hands on top of each other the illusion can be reliably 
induced (Bekrater-Bodmann, Foell, Diers, & Flor, 2012; Ehrsson et al., 2004; 
Haggard & Jundi, 2009, Kammers et al., 2009).  
Figure 5-1: Illustration of the setup used in the experiments. A life-sized model hand is placed on a 
box. The participant places the arm on the table with the hand inside the box. The right arm is 
covered with an opaque cloth to prevent sight from the own body. This creates a perspective as if 
the model hand belongs the participant´s own outstretched arm.   
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5.2.2 Experimental procedure  
In all experiments we used a procedure in which participants execute simple index 
finger taps (i.e., extension movement) at a rate of approximately 1Hz. Participants were 
trained to tap with a metronome before the experiment and instructed by the 
experimenter to execute the movements in the appropriate way. We decided not to use 
a metronome to pace the participant’s movements during the actual experiment and 
instead let the participants move the finger freely. A concern here is that with a 
metronome participants might coordinate their movements with the external signal 
instead, which is known to evoke different neuro-cognitive processes (Jahanshahi, 
Jenkins, Brown, Marsden, Passingham, et al., 1995).  
 
Participants were instructed to randomly introduce a “double-tap” (i.e., two rapid 
successive taps instead of a single tap). These double taps helped to control for 
habituation and also for alertness of the participants. Participants typically executed 3-5 
double taps throughout a trial. Again, participants were instructed to make those double 
taps freely, without any external signal. Thus, these double taps were similarly self-
paced. Each trial lasted typically between 90 and 120 sec. Participants had a break 
between each trial (between 30 – 45 sec) and were instructed to remove their hand out 
of the box and stretch and relax the right arm. These pauses help to prevent carry-over 
effects from one trial to the next. All trials were randomized and counterbalanced to 
control for order effects.   
 
Throughout our experiments we applied various manipulations: we varied the timing of 
the feedback (Synchronous versus Asynchronous), the mode of movement (Active 
versus Passive) and the position of the model hand (Congruent versus 180° rotated):  
 
Timing: A widely used manipulation is the timing. During synchronous movement the 
model hand´s finger moves in synchrony with the participant´s finger. In asynchronous 
movements the model hand´s finger is disconnected from the participant´s finger and is 
moved by the experimenter with a delay. When we use the term “asynchronous”, we 
strictly use it a temporal manner. This means that the model hand finger moves 
approximately 500 ms after the participant´s hand and both events do not coincide at 
any given moment in time. Crucially, this stimulation procedure ensures that the 
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number of sensory events is equal in each condition (i.e., same number of fingers taps 
and visually observed finger taps).  
 
Mode: During active movements the participant executes the finger movement by him 
or herself. In passive movements the experimenter moved the connecting stick while the 
participant remained passive and did not actively participate in the generation of the 
movement. The experimenter here mimicked the finger movements of the participant 
by observing the participant in the training phase, so making the passive finger 
movement similar in terms of amplitude or movement speed. 
 
Position: The position of the model hand can be changed. Typically the hand lays in a 
posture congruent to the participant´s outstretched arm on the table, thus in an 
anatomically plausible position. We also placed the rubber hand in an incongruent 
position, where we rotated the model hand to a 180°. This rotation induces a mismatch 
between the visually observed (model) hand and felt position of the (participant´s) 
hand; see Fig. 5.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2: The model hand can be 
placed in an anatomically plausible 
position (upper) or a 180° rotated 
(lower). Note that the cloth covering 
the right arm is removed here for 
illustration purposes. 
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In experiments in which we compared the moving rubber hand illusion to the classical 
illusion (Study II and III) we carefully adopted the procedure described above for the 
visuotactile stimulation. Instead of the finger tap we applied a tactile stimulus by using 
a small brush to both the participant´s and model hand´s index finger at a rate of 1Hz, 
which is done either synchronously or asynchronously. During asynchronous 
stimulation the model hand´s finger is touched after the participant´s finger is touched. 
This is similar to the movement condition in which the participant moves first and then 
the model hand moves. Also here we introduced some double stimulation (i.e., “double 
strokes”) as the equivalent to the “double taps” in the moving rubber hand illusion. 
With this procedure we aimed to keep the temporal characteristics of the stimulation 
and number of sensory events equal across induction types. When I use the term 
“induction type” in the following, I refer to the three different ways of inducing the 
Figure 5-3: The three different 
ways to induce the illusion:  
 
a) Active movements:         
The participant makes 
simple index finger taps. 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Passive movements:  
The experimenter moves 
both the model hand´s and 
participant´s index finger 
with the connecting stick. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c) Visuotactile stimulation: 
The experimenter applies 
brush strokes on both index 
fingers. No movement is 
present here.  
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illusion: active movements, passive movement and visuotactile stimulation (= classical 
version of the rubber hand illusion), see Fig. 5-3. 
 
5.2.3 Measuring the experience of the illusion 
5.2.3.1 A subjective measure: Questionnaire 
 
In our questionnaire assessment we always used multiple statements reflecting the 
experience of ownership (e.g., “I felt the rubber hand was my own hand”) and agency 
(e.g., “I felt as if I control the movement of the rubber hand”). Participants rated these 
on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 to +3, where 0 indicates uncertainty. 
We then averaged these ratings to an overall ownership or agency rating score. At the 
same time we also included control statements for both ratings, which did not reflect 
the experience of ownership and agency (e.g., “I felt as if my right hand disappeared” 
or “I felt as if the rubber hand a will of its own”). These statements control for overall 
task compliance and unspecific responses. Statements were adopted from previous 
experiments and modified (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Longo et al., 2008).  
 
Questionnaire items 1 
 
Ownership: Statements in this category reflect the experience of perceiving the model 
hand as part of the own body, thus reflecting the sense of ownership.  
 
1. I felt as if I was looking at my own hand 
2. I felt as if the rubber hand was part of my body 
3. It seemed as if I were sensing the movement of my finger in the location where 
the rubber finger moved 
4. I felt as if the rubber hand was my hand 
 
Many studies on the classical illusion use the referral of touch statement, which refers 
to when the participant perceives the tactile stimulus at the place where the model is 
touched. This statement is often highly rated during the illusion. We excluded this 
statement from our questionnaire, as no external stimulation is present in the moving 
rubber hand illusion.  
                                                
1 Please refer to the studies to see the statements used in each individual experiment 
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Ownership Control: These statements reflect a possible somatic sensation of the 
model hand or real hand, which are unrelated to the experience of ownership of the 
model hand.  
 
1. I felt as if my real hand were turning rubbery 
2. It seems as if I had more than one right hand 
3. It appeared as if the rubber hand were drifting towards my real hand 
4. It felt as if I had no longer a right hand, as if my right hand had disappeared 
 
Agency: The agency statements reflect the sense of being the author of the model 
hand´s movements, thus being able to exert control over the hand or being able to cause 
the hand to move.  
 
1. The rubber hand moved just like I wanted it to, as if it was obeying my will 
2. I felt as if I was controlling the movements of the rubber hand 
3. I felt as if I was causing the movement I saw 
4. Whenever I moved my finger I expected the rubber finger to move in the same 
way 
 
Because in some experiments (Study II and III) we directly compare the moving rubber 
hand illusion to the classical illusion (in which no movement occurs), we reformulated 
the agency statements. These statements were formulated in a way as if the participants 
could be able to move the hand if they wanted to do so, see also Longo et al. (2008). 
This differs from the experience of an executed movement, and therefore is more an 
indirect measure of agency.  
 
1. I felt as if I could cause movements of the rubber hand 
2. I felt as if I could control movements of the rubber hand 
3. The rubber hand was obeying my will and I can make it move just like I want 
it 
 
Agency Control: Statements in this category reflect an experience of will or causation, 
but not in a way where the participant feels being in control over the model hand.  
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1. I felt as if the rubber hand was controlling my will 
2. I felt as if the rubber hand was controlling my movements 
3. I could sense the movement from somewhere between my real hand and the 
rubber hand 
4. It seemed as if the rubber hand had a will of its own 
 
We analysed the questionnaire ratings according the following logic in order conclude 
that participants report a clear experience of ownership and agency:  
 
1) The median group rating should be equal or higher than +1, which requires 
that the majority of participants give a clear positive rating. 
2) Within the condition the ownership or agency rating should be significantly 
different to its control rating (e.g., Ownership versus Ownership Control 
rating in synchronous movements). 
3) The control rating should not be affirmed, thus participants should not 
positively rate these unrelated statements.  
4) The ownership or agency rating should be significantly different to the same 
rating of a control condition (e.g., Ownership rating Synchronous vs. 
Ownership rating Asynchronous). 
 
To compare the ratings across conditions we use a Wilcoxon test for pairwise 
comparison and a Friedmann test for multiple comparisons.   
 
As an additional measure we used the cut-off score of +1 to categorise participants into 
responders (i.e., illusion) and non-responders (i.e., no illusion), and we compare the 
number of responders across conditions. With responder we mean a participant who 
gave high affirmative ratings of ownership or agency (≥ +1). This is motivated by the 
following objective.  When we observe a significant difference in the ownership ratings 
between two conditions, then this could be rooted in two different reasons:  
1. There is a true difference between the strength of the ownership experience of 
the two conditions or  
2. The number of ownership responders (i.e., participants who in principal are 
responsive to the illusion) is just lower, so which can in turn lead to lower 
average rating in this condition.  
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Thus, the difference might not necessarily be a true difference in the strength of the 
rating of the participants experiencing the illusion, but in the overall number of 
participants responding to the illusion per se (given we have to assume that a proportion 
of participants will not experience the illusion per se). To disentangle both these 
possibilities we use both these statistical comparisons (i.e., the absolute ratings and the 
number of responders) to examine the potential differences between the conditions. 
This additional analysis can give some further insight into the specific differences 
observed. In sum, we aim to ensure a specific assessment of the questionnaire to 
evaluate the experience of ownership and agency in our participants.  
 
5.2.3.2 An objective measure: Proprioceptive drift 
 
We used a proprioceptive drift task as an objective and complementary measure of the 
illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris et al., 2006; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005b). 
It consists of a pointing procedure in which the participant has to indicate the perceived 
position of the right (stimulated) hand, with the eyes closed. Participants pointed with 
the left (unstimulated) index finger on a board with a millimetre grid, mounted on the 
left side of the box (see Fig. 5-4). As such pointing movements can exhibit a certain 
degree of variability we use multiple repetitions (i.e., three repetitions per condition) 
and average the three values. We then compare the drift values in the different 
conditions (e.g., synchronous versus asynchronous feedback). The data was tested for 
normality with a Shapiro-Wilk test and the appropriate parametrical or non-
parametrical tests have been used.  
 
 
  
Figure 5-4: Illustration of the setup 
used in the proprioceptive drift 
experiments. Participants pointed 
to the felt position of the right hand 
with their left index finger. 
 
 
 
 
We obtain two measurements per trial: a pre- and post – pointing value, which are 
subtracted from each other to derive a single value (Post minus Pre). A positive value 
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represents a drift upwards (i.e., towards the rubber hand). This positive drift indicates 
that the participants perceived their real hand to be closer to the model hand. This 
procedure differs from other approaches to measure the proprioceptive drift, which use 
perceptual position judgments instead of a pointing movement (Riemer et al., 2013; 
Tsakiris et al., 2006).  
 
5.3 SHORT SUMMARY OF THE STUDIES 
 
Study I 
In the first study we tested 104 naïve participants in four different experiments. We 
aimed to validate the setup (Exp.1 and 2) by comparing the effect of synchronous and 
asynchronous feedback on the subjective experience (Exp.1, n = 20) and proprioceptive 
drift (Exp. 2, n = 20). Subsequently we tested the effect of different manipulations on 
the experience of ownership and agency (Exp. 3 and 4). We varied the mode of the 
movement (active versus passive) and position of the model hand (congruent versus 
rotated) and examined the subjective experience (Exp. 3, n = 32) and the proprioceptive 
drift (Exp. 4, n = 32).  
 
Study II 
In study II we tested 60 naïve participants and directly compared active movements, 
passive movements and visuotactile stimulation as different ways to induce the illusion 
of ownership. We examined the subjective experience of ownership and agency in all 
three induction types with synchronous and asynchronous stimulation (Exp. 1, n = 40). 
In Experiment 2 (n = 20) we compared active movements with visuotactile stimulation 
by using the proprioceptive drift.  
 
Study III 
In the third study we examined the effect of distance between the hands in 60 naïve 
participants. We compared the moving (active movements) and classical rubber hand 
illusion at three different distances between the model hand and the hand of the 
participant. In Experiment 1 we tested 40 participants with synchronous and 
asynchronous stimulation at the three distances of 12 cm, 27.5 cm, and 43 cm. In 
Experiment 2 (n = 20) we tested the moving rubber hand illusion at the distance of 12 
and 27.5 cm using the proprioceptive drift test.  
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Study IV 
In the fourth study we explored the potential link of the experience of ownership and 
agency in the moving rubber hand illusion to traits of delusions in a healthy group of 
participants. 72 naïve participants experienced active and passive movements (with 
synchronous or asynchronous feedback). We used the Peter´s delusion inventory (PDI) 
to assess the presence of delusional believes, which serves as an indicator for 
tendencies of psychotic traits. We examined potential links between unusual tendencies 
in the ownership and agency experience (as measures for bodily self-recognition) in the 
moving rubber hand illusion and delusional traits as measured by the PDI scores for 
each individual.  
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6 RESULTS  
 
6.1.1 Inducing the illusion with movements 
After active synchronous movements participants gave high ratings of ownership 
(Median in Study I = 2.0, Study II = 1.7, Study III = 1.7, Study VI = 2.0)2. Thus, 
observing a model hand that moves in synchrony with the participant´s own movement 
evokes a strong illusion of ownership towards the model hand (see Fig. 6.1). When the 
feedback was asynchronous (Study I, II, III and IV) or the model hand was rotated to a 
180° (Study I), the ownership ratings were always negatively rated. Similarly, the 
ownership control ratings were negatively rated in all studies.  
 
 
Figure 6-1: Ownership ratings of the synchronous (dark) versus asynchronous (light)  
active conditions of the four studies. A strong experience of ownership has been always  
reported in the synchronous conditions. 
 
When we classify the participants as illusion responders by using a cut-off score of +1, 
we see that the majority of participants experience a strong illusion. Across studies 
about 72% (ranging from 63 – 86%) of our participants experienced a sense of 
                                                
2  Please note that the values of Study I differ here from the figures in the publication (Kalckert and 
Ehrsson, 2012), in which the mean values are shown. Here, we use the median, as in all subsequent 
studies to show the data. 
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ownership in the synchronous conditions (see Table 1). This is in line with other reports 
reporting that about 60 to 80% of the participants experience an illusion (Ehrsson et al., 
2004; 2005; Lloyd, 2007). 
 
 Study I Study II Study III Study IV 
Percentage 75 % 63% 65% 86% 
 
Table 1: Table showing the percentage of illusion responders (ownership rating of ≥ +1) in the 
synchronous conditions: Study I, Exp.1; Study II, Exp. 1; Study III, Exp. 1; Study IV.  
 
In the moving rubber hand the illusion can be a result of active or passive movements. 
In Study I, II, and IV we tested active and passive movements. Passively experienced 
movements can trigger an ownership illusion just as active movements. Also during 
passive movements a proprioceptive drift of similar magnitude can be observed (Study 
I, Exp. 4). Therefore, we can conclude that efferent signals are not necessary to induce 
the illusion, as in passive movements also the match between the visually observed 
finger and the (passively) felt movement is sufficient to induce the illusion. However, it 
seems that active movement result in slightly higher ratings than passive movement 
(Fig. 6-2). In study I and IV we observed here a significant difference between active 
and passive movement condition, but not in Study II. For further discussion whether the 
illusion differs between active and passive movement, see Section 6.1.4.  
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Figure 6-2: Ownership ratings in the active (dark) versus passive (light) conditions  
in the three studies in which we directly compared active and passive movements. 
 
In sum, our experiments consistently show that the present setup is able to reliably 
evoke the illusion by movements without any external visuotactile stimulation. Both 
active and passive movement induce an experience of ownership.  
 
6.1.2 Manipulating the ownership experience 
We explored the perceptual rules of the moving rubber hand illusion and found them to 
be similar to observations in the classical rubber hand illusion. We found similar to the 
classical illusion that the temporal rule, spatial rule and anatomical plausibility rule 
apply to the moving rubber hand illusion.  
 
Temporal rule: Asynchronous stimulation effectively cancels out the ownership 
illusion. In all experiments we included    asynchronous movements as a control 
condition. Indeed, in asynchronous movements the majority of participants did not 
experience the illusions as indicated by the negative ratings in all our experiments; see 
Fig. 6-1.  
 
Spatial rule: Studies have shown that the two hands must be sufficiently close in space 
to induce the illusion (Lloyd, 2007; Preston, 2013). In Study III we varied the distance 
between the two hands (ranging from 12 to 43 cm). We also saw that there is a spatial 
44 
limit to the illusion in the moving rubber hand, similar to the classical version. Thus 
with increasing distance the illusion of ownership is abolished. Already at a distance of 
27 cm significantly fewer participants experienced the illusion (Median = 0,3), which 
suggests a narrower spatial window than the classical rubber hand illusion.  
 
Anatomical plausibility: A critical factor is the anatomical plausibility of the hand, 
thus the relative position of the rubber hand with respect to the participant’s arm 
(Ehrsson et al., 2004; Ide, 2013; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005b). In Study I we rotated 
the model hand to an anatomical implausible position (i.e., 180° rotated), which 
effectively eliminated the illusion of ownership. This was confirmed by both the 
subjective ratings (Exp. 3) and a lack of proprioceptive drift (Exp. 4).  
 
6.1.3 Manipulating the agency experience 
In all experiments we not only examined the experience of ownership, but also the 
experience of agency. Whenever the model hand´s finger moved synchronously with 
the active finger movements of the participants, a strong sensation of agency over the 
observed finger movements was reported (Median in Study I = 2.5, Study II = 2.7, 
Study III = 2.7, Study VI = 3.0). The agency ratings were reduced during asynchronous 
feedback, but never clearly denied in the active conditions (see Fig. 6-3).  
 
 
Figure 6-3: Agency ratings in the synchronous (dark) versus asynchronous active  
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conditions (light) in all four studies. Asynchronous feedback significantly reduces  
agency, but does not lead to a complete negation of agency. 
 
Also during passive movements participants did not experience agency (Median in 
Study I = -0.7, Study II = 0.0, Study VI = -0.5). As can be seen in Fig. 6-4 agency 
ratings tended to be negatively rated in passive movement conditions.  
 
 
Figure 6-4: Agency ratings in the active (dark) and passive (light) synchronous  
conditions, agency is significantly affected by the mode of movement generation. 
 
As both passive movement and asynchrony can influence the experience of agency, we 
can ask which of these two manipulations is actually more potent to reduce agency 
(Study I and II). In Study I we could only make this comparison between groups and 
found that the agency rating was significantly higher in the asynchronous condition 
(Exp. 1) than in the passive conditions (Exp. 3). We replicated this finding in Study II 
with a within-group comparison and found again higher agency ratings in the 
asynchronous condition as well  (Z = -2.492, p = .01; not reported in Study II). Thus, 
passive movements lead to significantly lower agency ratings than asynchronous 
feedback. 
 
6.1.4 Manipulating the sense of ownership and agency 
The three manipulations we applied (Timing, Mode, Position) differently affected the 
experience of ownership and agency. 
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Timing: the timing of the feedback affects both ownership and agency, thus when the 
model hand moves asynchronously participants do not experience neither ownership 
nor agency (see Study I, II, III and IV).  
 
Mode: when participants experienced passive movements, then they did not report an 
experience of agency. However, ownership can still be experienced, irrespective if the 
hand moves actively or passively (Study I, Exp. 3; Study II, Exp. 1).  
 
Position: when the model hand was rotated to a 180°, then participants did not 
experience ownership. In contrast, a sense of agency can still be experienced (see Study 
I, Exp. 3). Thus, the position of the model hand did not directly affect the experience of 
agency, but affected ownership.  
 
Taken together, these results suggest that ownership and agency obey different 
perceptual rules. Whereas timing affects both ownership and agency, the mode 
primarily affected the agency experience and the position the ownership experience.  
Therefore, when combining the above-mentioned manipulations it should be possible to 
affect either ownership or agency in isolation. In Study I (Exp. 3 and 4) we demonstrate 
that both ownership and agency can be directly targeted by the appropriate combination 
of manipulations (see Fig. 6-5). In these experiments we applied two manipulations: 
mode of movements (i.e., active versus passive), and anatomically plausibility (i.e., 
congruent posture versus 180° rotated position). In active congruent movement 
participants experienced a sense of ownership and agency at the same time. In passive 
congruent movements agency was not experienced, but a sense of ownership was still 
present. When the hand rotated to a 180°, then during active movements participants 
experienced a sense of agency, but not during passive movements  (Exp. 3).  
 
This was supported by the drift experiment. A drift was present in the two congruent 
conditions in which participants experienced ownership. This was not the case for the 
two incongruent conditions in which ownership was not experienced (Exp. 4). In 
conclusion, this observation demonstrates a dissociation of ownership and agency.  
 
Further support for this claim can be drawn from Study III: when we increased the 
distance between the two hands, we observed a reduction in the ownership sensation 
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with increasing distance, thus at further distances participants do not experience 
ownership. However, participants still experience a sense of agency over the perceived 
finger movements, also at the furthest distance of 43 cm. Thus, the spatial rule applies 
to ownership, but not agency. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-5: Results showing the dissociation of ownership and agency. Upper graph 
shows the original result in Study I, Exp. 3. The lower graph shows a replication of 
this result in Exp.  4 (not shown in Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). 
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6.1.5 Interaction of ownership and agency 
A crucial question is whether and if so, how ownership and agency influence each 
other. A good starting point to answer this question is to compare the individual ratings 
across conditions and examine if the ownership ratings are higher during active than in 
passive movements. This would suggest that active movements lead to a stronger 
ownership illusion. Our results across studies are mixed in this regard: in study I we 
found that the overall ratings in active movements were higher than in passive 
movements. The number of responders however was not statistically different though, 
from which we can conclude that active movements do not result in a higher number of 
responders. Those participants who experience the illusion gave slightly higher ratings 
(Exp. 3). The drift data however indicated no significant difference between active and 
passive movements (Exp. 4). Therefore we could not confidently conclude that active 
movements lead to a stronger ownership illusion. Also in Study IV we saw higher 
ownership ratings in active movements. In study II however, where we directly 
compared the different induction types, we did not find a significant difference between 
active and passive movements: neither in the ratings nor in the number of responders. 
Active movements also did not lead to a stronger drift than in the classical illusion 
using visuotactile stimulation (Study II, Exp. 2).  
 
Another way to address the issue under discussion is to look for correlations between 
the ownership and agency ratings. In Study I and II we indeed found correlations 
between ownership and agency. These were observed only in those conditions in which 
the hand moved synchronously and the model hand was placed in a congruent position. 
When the model hand was rotated, then this correlation was not present (Study I, Exp. 
3). This suggests that this interaction between ownership and agency is not present in 
all situations.  
 
In Study I (Exp. 3) we performed an interaction like analysis to further elucidate this 
seemingly complex relationship between ownership and agency. In this analysis we 
asked whether ownership ratings are always higher in active movements than in passive 
movements, irrespective of the position of the model hand. To this end we computed a 
difference-score between the congruent and rotated conditions for both active and 
passive movements. This difference was not significant, therefore suggesting that in 
active movements ownership ratings are not per se higher than in passive movements. 
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Likewise, we performed this kind of interaction analysis for the agency ratings: here we 
asked the question whether the position of the model hand affects the agency ratings, 
while keeping in mind that the two congruent conditions are conditions in which 
participants experience ownership. Thus, we ask whether in the ownership conditions 
the agency ratings are higher than in non-ownership (i.e., rotated) condition. This 
difference approached significance (p = .06), which perhaps suggests that agency 
ratings tend to be higher in the context of ownership. In Study II (Exp. 1) we found 
further, albeit more indirect, support for this conclusion: in the passive and visuotactile 
conditions the agency ratings increased during synchronous stimulation, as compared to 
asynchronous stimulations. In fact, one could expect that in the passive conditions it 
should not make a difference whether the feedback is synchronous or asynchronous. In 
these conditions no movement intention is formed, whose prediction could be violated 
by the asynchronous feedback. Still the agency ratings increased, which might suggest 
that a sense of ownership results also in a slight increase of agency. Taken together, 
these observations suggest that ownership might enhance the experience of agency, but 
that agency does not facilitate ownership per se. 
 
6.1.6 The classical and moving rubber hand illusion 
In study II and III we not only tested the moving rubber hand illusion, but also directly 
compared it the classical rubber hand illusion in the same group of participants.  
Both the moving and the classical rubber hand illusion obey very similar perceptual 
rules. For example, similar to the classical version the moving rubber hand illusion is 
abolished after asynchronous stimulation or rotation of the model hand (Study I, Exp. 3 
and 4).  
 
After synchronous visuotactile stimulation or synchronous movements participants 
positively rated the ownership statements. The median ratings across studies were 
identical and let us conclude that the illusion in the moving rubber hand illusion is as 
strong as in the classical version; see Fig. 6-6.  
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Figure 6-6: Ownership ratings of the synchronous conditions of the moving and  
classical rubber hand illusion in direct comparison. Both versions lead to strong  
experience of ownership, even of equal strength.  
 
Also the number of illusion responders is very similar across induction types, therefore 
the specific way of inducing the illusion is not critical (although some interindividual 
differences were noticed, see Study II).  
 
Moreover, the ownership ratings were highly correlated between induction types. In 
Study II we directly compared the three different induction types and examined 
whether the ownership ratings correlate between the different synchronous conditions, 
in which an illusion was present. Indeed we found a high correlation between active 
movements, passive movement, and visuotactile stimulation. In study III (Exp. 1) we 
similarly observed a high correlation between the ownership ratings between active 
movements and visuotactile stimulation (at the closest distance). This supports the idea 
of similar mechanisms involved in the different versions of the illusion. 
 
Besides this general agreement, we noticed indications for a difference between 
moving and classical illusion in study III. When we varied the distance between the 
participant´s hand and model hand we saw that both induction types exhibit a spatial 
limit. Thus, with increasing distance the illusion is substantially diminished. The 
moving rubber hand illusion appears to follow a somewhat narrower spatial rule. 
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Whereas in the classical illusion participants still affirm ownership at the 27 cm 
distance, this was not the case for the moving rubber hand illusion. At this distance of 
27 cm the absolute ratings were significantly lower than at the 12 cm distance and no 
significant proprioceptive drift between synchronous and asynchronous condition was 
observed. This observation merits further investigation and might represent the only 
noticeable dissimilarity we have seen in our experiments so far when comparing 
moving and classical rubber hand illusion.  
 
Taken together, our results suggest that both versions are strongly related to each other 
and draw upon similar processes in the ownership illusion. However, agency is only 
clearly experienced in the moving rubber hand illusion, when participants voluntary 
move the finger and get synchronous feedback.  
 
6.1.7 The proprioceptive drift as an objective measure 
In Study I, II and III we measured the proprioceptive drift as an additional objective 
measure. We repeatedly found that during the illusion participants show a drift towards 
the model hand (as a significant difference between the drift in the synchronous versus 
asynchronous condition; see Study I, Exp. 2 and 4; Study II, Exp. 2 and Study III, Exp. 
2). Thus a drift was present in conditions in which participants experienced ownership 
of the hand, irrespective of induction type.  
 
We also correlated the drift with the subjective ratings to test whether participants with 
a particular strong illusion also show a stronger drift in the same conditions. Indeed this 
was the case, as reported in previous studies (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Longo et al., 
2008).  As in synchronous con  ditions participants not only experience ownership, but 
also agency, we also correlated the drift measure with agency ratings. Here we did not 
find a significant correlation between drift and agency ratings (see Study I, Exp. 2; 
Study II, Exp. 2). Similarly we did not observe a drift in the active incongruent 
condition in Study I (Exp. 4), when participants feel only agency, but not ownership.  
Therefore we conclude that the proprioceptive drift is a measure of the ownership 
experience. So, only during the ownership illusion a relocation of the felt position of 
the own hand towards the rubber hand can be observed, but not during the experience 
of agency; see Fig. 6-7.  
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Figure 6-7: Correlations between the proprioceptive drift and the subjective ratings of  
ownership and agency. The drift is correlated to the ownership ratings, but not agency  
 
 
6.1.8 Bodily self-recognition and delusion proneness 
In Study IV we examined the relationship between ratings of ownership and agency as 
measures of self-recognition and delusion proneness. We found that individuals on the 
high end of the spectrum reveal tendencies for an increased sense of agency in passive 
movements, whereas active movements are perceived essentially in the same way by 
participants with high – or low delusional tendencies. Besides this specific observation, 
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which was dependent on the fact of whether participants moved actively or passively, 
an overall general increase of ownership ratings across conditions with increasing 
delusion proneness was observed too. This suggests that delusion-prone participants 
exhibit an atypical experience in the moving rubber hand illusion; see Fig. 6-8.  
 
 
Figure 6-8: Results of the questionnaire in study IV (upper). Lower graphs show  
correlations to the PDI scores when active versus passive movements are compared.  
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6.1.9 Further observations 
 
6.1.9.1 The effect of handedness 
 
In Study II we measured the laterality by using the Edinburgh Inventory for handedness 
(Oldfield, 1971). In Exp. 1 the average laterality (LQ) was 69.7 (SD 42.5, range: -73.3 
to 100). We correlated the LQ using a Spearman rank correlation to the ownership 
category to the synchronous condition of active movements, passive movements, and 
visuotactile stimulation to check if the strength of the illusion is influenced by the 
handedness. We did not find a significant correlation between the handedness and 
ownership rating in the active movements condition (r = 0.213, n = 40, p = .186), 
passive movements condition (r = 0.008, n = 40, p = .959) or visuotactile condition (r = 
0.087, n = 40, p = .594). Similarly, we did not find any significant correlation of the LQ 
to the agency rating in the active movements condition (r = -0.118, n = 40, p = .470), 
passive movements condition (r = 0.086, n = 40, p = .598 or visuotactile condition  (r = 
-0.033, n = 40, p = .840). In Exp. 2 we correlated LQ with the proprioceptive drift and 
found no significant correlation in any of the four conditions: Active synchronous (r = 
0.153, n = 20, p = .519), Active asynchronous (r = 0.397, n = 20, p = .083), Visuotactile 
synchronous (r = -0.235, n = 20, p = .319) and Visuotactile asynchronous (r = -0.177, n 
= 20, p = .456). Therefore we conclude that handedness did not affect the presented 
results in terms of subjective strength or proprioceptive drift.  
 
6.1.9.2 The illusion onset 
 
As part of a screening procedure for another study we also tested the onset of the 
illusion in 128 participants (72 females, mean age = 24,4 years, SD ± 5.2). Participants 
who experience a clear illusion in the synchronous conditions (≥ +1) and deny the 
illusion in the asynchronous illusion were asked three times to indicate the onset of the 
illusion (i.e., when they perceive the rubber hand to be their own hand). The average 
onset during active synchronous movements (n = 61) was 23.1 sec (SD 18.5; range: 3.0 
- 95.7 sec) and for passive movements (n = 63) the average was 22.9 sec (SD 18.4; 
range: 3.7 - 82 sec). When comparing the average onset time we found no significant 
difference (Mann-Whitney U Test: Z = -0.52, p = .958). This suggests similar illusion 
onset times for active and passive movements conditions.  
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7 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The presented experiments demonstrate that movements can reliably induce the rubber 
hand illusion and the moving rubber hand illusion obeys perceptual rules akin to the 
classical version. Naturally, some findings are in line with previous observations and 
frameworks, some findings do not agree with previous results, and some findings leave 
questions open for further investigations.  
 
7.1 THE OWNERSHIP ILLUSION BY MOVEMENTS 
Based on our observations we can conclude that movements can induce a strong 
ownership experience, fully comparable to the classical version of the rubber hand 
illusion. Although we found that the subjective experience of ownership can be 
sometimes stronger in the active movements conditions, which would argue for the 
contribution of agency mechanisms to the sense of ownership, we could not replicate 
this tendency using the proprioceptive drift measure or the onset measurement. 
Therefore we conclude that the ownership illusion is equally strong across induction 
types, and that the moving rubber hand illusion appears to be very similar to the 
classical illusion. 
 
This is further supported by our observations that the moving rubber hand illusion 
obeys similar perceptual rules to the rubber hand illusion. Like the classical version of 
the illusion a temporal rule, a spatial rule and an anatomical plausibility rule can be 
observed here as well. When the feedback is asynchronous, the distance between the 
hands is increased, or the model hand is placed in an implausible (rotated) position, the 
illusion of ownership cannot be induced. The overall similarities are striking, 
considering the differences between the moving and classical illusion. In the moving 
rubber hand illusion not only the sense of agency is present, but also the movements 
generate a very different kind of sensory input. Instead of two rather discrete sensory 
events (i.e., the vision of the brush touching the rubber hand and the felt touch on the 
real hand) the moving rubber hand illusion generates a richer set of sensory inputs. 
Kinaesthetic input like skin stretch, muscle spindles and joint receptors signal the on-
going movement (Edin & Abbs, 1991; Edin & Johansson, 1995; Proske & Gandevia, 
2012), complemented by efferent signals in the active movements, which could also 
contribute to kinaesthesia (Christensen et al., 2010; Gandevia, Smith, Crawford, 
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Proske, & Taylor, 2006; Matthews, 1982). Still, the moving rubber hand illusion obeys 
an analogous set of perceptual rules. This suggests that irrespective of the sensory 
modality, a similar, if not identical, mechanism generates the experience of ownership 
by integrating different sensory input from the body. In light of these findings it can be 
speculated whether the illusion in the moving rubber hand illusion also recruits similar 
neural structures like the classical illusion (Ehrsson et al., 2004). Given the role of 
structures like the premotor and posterior parietal cortex for motor control (Culham & 
Valyear, 2006; Fogassi & Luppino, 2005; Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001), it seems likely 
that these structures are involved in the moving rubber hand illusion as well. A possible 
interaction between ownership and agency mechanisms may be very well mediated by 
these structures.  
 
7.2 AGENCY IN THE RUBBER HAND ILLUSION 
A fundamental difference between the moving and classical rubber hand illusion is the 
presence of the sense of agency. This requires active movements, where the participant 
forms motor intentions and receives sensory feedback that matches the motor 
intentions. This speaks for the involvement of efference copy mechanisms and 
sensorimotor contingencies in the sense of agency in the moving rubber hand illusion 
(David et al., 2008; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000b). Both the lack of motor 
intentions and discrepant (i.e., temporally delayed) sensory feedback affects the sense 
of agency, but the former is more critical in the generation of agency. In passive 
movements the sense of agency is more reduced than with asynchronous feedback. In 
asynchronous movements the agency experience can be relatively high, as compared to 
passive conditions. This highlights the role of motor intentions in the experience of 
agency (Haggard, 2005). Unlike the sense of ownership the rotation of the model hand 
did not change the experience of agency. Participants experienced agency in both these 
two situations. Therefore we conclude that agency can be detached from ownership of 
the model hand and experienced in two different contexts: agency over an embodied 
entity, when participants feel ownership at the same time; and agency over a 
disembodied entity, so without ownership. The difference between these two situations 
has been rarely investigated and clarified (S. Gallagher, 2007; 2012; Sperduti, 
Delaveau, Fossati, & Nadel, 2011; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005a). To gain clarity about 
what “internal agency” or “self-agency” refers to and what distinguishes it from 
“external agency” one could define internal agency as agency in an embodied context, 
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so including the experience of ownership. Whether this definition matches other 
concepts like “self-agency” or “feeling of agency” needs further investigation. Future 
research could examine whether these two contexts imply different neuro-cognitive 
mechanisms. This could help to understand some of the discrepancies found in the 
previous literature.  Importantly, this should be re-examined with an objective measure 
of the sense of agency, which we did not use in the present of line work.  
 
These investigations could also examine spatiotemporal thresholds like in classical 
agency paradigms outlined before (see Section 3.2), but including a clear 
operationalization of ownership and agency. Shimada and colleagues (2009) examined 
whether detection thresholds differ between active and passive movements, therefore 
examining the role of agency related mechanisms for the threshold detection. They did 
not find a significant difference in the absolute threshold, but in the steepness of 
detection curves (Shimada, Qi, & Hiraki, 2009b). Following this line of thought we 
plan to examine whether the temporal threshold in a mismatch detection paradigm 
changes when participants not only feel agency over the visually observed hand 
movements, but also ownership.  
 
7.3 HOW DO OWNERSHIP AND AGENCY INTERACT 
The dissociability of ownership and agency raises interesting questions about the nature 
of their relationship and their contribution to bodily self-recognition. Our results 
suggest that ownership and agency can be dissociated: Ownership can be experienced 
without agency (i.e., in passive movement conditions), but agency can be experienced 
also without a feeling of ownership (i.e., in the incongruent conditions). At the same 
time we also found indications for interactions: ownership seems to increase the 
tendency for agency, but agency does not lead to ownership per se. That ownership 
might automatically increase the tendency for agency is conceivable: we normally 
experience our body by movements and our ability to control these movements. 
Therefore, anything that is perceived to be part of my body should also be movable and 
controllable. At the same time if we think of a switch, which we can use to control a 
light bulb, we do not necessarily would feel the light bulb to be part of our body despite 
the fact we are perfectly able to control it. Thus, agency must not automatically 
generate ownership. 
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Our observations do not agree with previous conclusions on the relationship of 
ownership and agency. Tsakiris and colleagues (2007b) suggested that the “…Sense of 
agency normally implies ownership (one knows one is controlling one’s own body), but 
ownership does not imply a sense of agency since the presence of self-generated 
movements is necessary for the sense of agency, but not for body-ownership.” (p. 647). 
Our results do not directly comply with this conclusion, because the sense of agency 
can be detached from ownership and experienced without a sense of ownership. 
Ownership might also increase the tendency to experience agency, with the obvious 
restriction that movements need to occur to generate a full-blown experience of agency. 
 
Later, Tsakiris and colleagues (2010) hypothesized two principal models that could 
describe the relationship of ownership and agency: an additive model, which suggests 
that both ownership and agency are related to each other, versus an independence 
model, in which both ownership and agency are distinct and separated experiences with 
no direct overlap. The results are mixed in a way that the behavioural data (i.e., 
subjective experience) would speak for an additive model with agency facilitating 
ownership (as indicated by higher ownership ratings). The results of the imaging 
experiment did not reflect this interactive process and would rather speak for an 
independent model of ownership and agency. One reason for this result could be the 
specific design of the experiment in which agency was always experienced in the 
context of ownership, thus never detached from ownership. Therefore, the contribution 
of each of the two processes might be still not completely separated.  
 
In a certain way our observations concur with both an additive model and independence 
model of ownership and agency. This could potentially be explained by the two 
different definitions of agency (Internal versus External), as outlined above.  
This conclusion may be important when re-examining the question of how ownership 
and agency interact. Our results suggest that ownership and agency can be related to 
each other, but in a directed way: ownership facilitates the (internal) sense of agency, 
but the (external) sense of agency must not facilitate the sense of ownership per se. A 
sense of agency alone does not imply ownership, as agency can be experienced without 
ownership over an internal object (external agency). Further investigations are needed 
to clarify the interaction between ownership and the two potential types of agency.  
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So, does ownership increase during movements as compared to the non-moving 
classical rubber hand illusion? Our results here were mixed, in line with the mixed 
results in the previous literature. When looking closer at our data, it often seems that 
ownership is higher during active than in passive movements. At a first glance this 
suggests that efference mechanisms contribute to the ownership sensation. However at 
the same time we also observed no differences between active movements and 
visuotactile stimulation. Other measures like the proprioceptive drift or the onset 
measurement also do not show this tendency for a stronger illusion in the active 
conditions. Other studies likewise did not find a difference in the strength of the illusion 
between the three induction types (Tsakiris et al., 2006), whereas others found 
indications for a stronger illusion in active movements (Dummer et al., 2009). 
 
If efference copy mechanisms facilitate the integrative process underlying the illusion, 
why do not we see also that active movements lead to a stronger illusion than the 
classical illusion? A way to reconcile these somehow contradicting observations is to 
consider the following speculation: in all three induction types we have a set of 
differing sensory input, which needs to be evaluated for coherence. In active 
movements we have kinaesthetic information from a variety of somatosensory input 
and efference copy mechanisms. In the passive movement we have the same 
kinaesthetic input, but lacking the efference copy. And finally in the classical illusion 
we have only two distinct sensory inputs (i.e., touch and vision). However, this must 
not mean that the condition with the highest number of available input (i.e., the active 
movements) will lead to the strongest illusion. A higher amount of sensory input means 
also a higher degree of noise (Faisal, Selen, & Wolpert, 2008), which adds processing 
demands especially for sensorimotor control (Harris & Wolpert, 1998). In the end the 
increased number of sensory input inevitably results in much more sensory noise to 
deal with. This can pose a problem when considering the statistical nature of perceptual 
processes (Ernst & Banks, 2002; Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 2006; Knill & Pouget, 
2004).  
 
A different, but related hypothesis why the illusion does not differ between induction 
types can be formulated when we assume that the central process underlying the 
illusion collects sensory signals until enough “evidence” is accumulated. Once enough 
sensory “evidence” is accumulated, meaning here correlated multisensory signals 
related to the hand, the illusion would be generated. In this way the illusion may not be 
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dependent on the specific pairings of multisensory stimuli, but on their mutual 
correlation and predictability.  
 
Future research could examine which modalities are critical or necessary for the 
illusion and how the perceptual weighting of this input in relation to sensory noise 
affects the integrative process underlying the illusion. Differences in the integration of 
multisensory stimuli could relate to interindividual differences in terms of susceptibility 
to the illusion. This could potentially explain why some participants might be particular 
responsive to one type of stimulation and why some participants are not experiencing 
the illusion at all.  
 
7.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL RESEARCH 
7.4.1 Clinical disturbances in body perception 
Neurological disturbances of the perception of the own body are multifaceted 
syndromes, including ownership and agency abnormalities. The involvement of 
structures like the premotor, posterior parietal cortex (in particular inferior parietal 
regions) and the insula in pathologies affecting the perception of the body like 
anosognosia or asomatognosia has been confirmed by a number of studies (Baier & 
Karnath, 2008; Berti et al., 2005; Karnath & Baier, 2010; Orfei et al., 2007; Zeller, 
Gross, Bartsch, Johansen-Berg, & Classen, 2011). At the same time we know that 
these structures are involved in the generation of ownership and agency (Brozzoli et 
al., 2012; Ehrsson et al., 2004; 2005; Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer, Frey, Van Horn, 
Tunik, Turk, et al., 2008b; Tsakiris et al., 2007a). The question arises how and where 
these aspects interact at the neural level when we perceive our own body moving. The 
present results might help to further clarify the exact relationship between ownership 
and (internal and external) agency also at a neural level by examining these functions 
with imaging techniques like fMRI or EEG. These insights could further elucidate 
these pathologies and help us to understand why patients exhibit certain pathologies. 
This could also elucidate why, for example, anosognosia and asomatognosia co-occur 
after lesions in the insula (Baier & Karnath, 2008), but anosognosia appears after 
lesions in the premotor cortex (Berti et al., 2005). A deeper investigation of 
ownership and agency at a behavioral and neural level with healthy participants might 
help us to better understand these observations in these patients.  
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The present rubber hand illusion paradigm could be a useful new tool to investigate the 
breakdown of ownership and agency in psychotic disorders, in particular schizophrenia. 
A leading hypothesis for a decade has been that some of the symptoms of 
schizophrenia might be explained by the breakdown in comparator mechanisms related 
to the sense of agency (Franck et al., 2001; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000b; 
Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod, & Franck, 2003; Shergill et al., 2005; 
Synofzik, Thier, Leube, Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2010; Voss et al., 2010), resulting 
in delusions of control and passivity symptoms (Frith, 2005a; 2005b; Jeannerod, 
2009). Recently schizophrenia researchers have also started to investigate the domain 
of body-ownership and possible impaired mechanisms of body representation by using 
the rubber hand illusion paradigm (Germine et al., 2012; Peled et al., 2000; Thakkar et 
al., 2011). Having said that the question arises how these disturbances of agency and 
ownership might interact to eventually result in the problems of self-recognition seen in 
psychotic disorders. Given that psychotic patient do not only have a distorted 
experience of agency, but also ownership (Waters & Badcock, 2010).   
 
From this perspective the present moving rubber hand illusion set-up could be a useful 
new approach for cognitive schizophrenia research to combine measurements of 
ownership and agency in a single paradigm and further explore how psychotic traits 
affect the experience of the own body or vice versa. As illustrated by Study IV not only 
psychotic patients, but also delusion-prone participants might already exhibit certain 
abnormal tendencies in their experience of their body. An interesting question can be 
formulated by asking whether self-recognition disturbances seen in schizophrenia are a 
result of changes in ownership and / or agency, and how both these processes interact 
when prodromal individuals converge to a clinically manifest psychosis. Future 
research could explore the factors behind psychotic disorders by using bodily illusions 
like the moving rubber hand, which tap more specifically into the mechanisms of self-
recognition by combining ownership and agency.  
 
7.4.2 Research on neuroprosthetics 
Recent years have seen increasing interest in how one could design advanced prosthetic 
limbs that would feel and act more like real limbs. These limbs could be controlled by 
brain-computer interfaces (Hochberg et al., 2006; Nicolelis, 2003; Schwartz, 2004; 
Velliste, Perel, Spalding, Whitford, & Schwartz, 2008), myo-electrically controlled 
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(Marasco, Kim, Colgate, Peshkin, & Kuiken, 2011), or be traditional cosmetic 
prostheses  (Ehrsson et al., 2008). Regardless of the technical design and degree of 
invasiveness it seems reasonable to assume that the user would benefit from 
experiencing both ownership and agency of the artificial limb. The basic cognitive and 
neuroscientific constraints of ownership and agency, as explored here, could thus be 
taken into account when developing the next generation of advanced prosthetic devices. 
That these insights from non-amputated participants can be transferred to the amputees 
is seen by the fact that the rubber hand illusion can be induced in amputated 
participants. The tactile stimulation is applied here at the place of the stump where the 
participants report a referred sensation to one of the digits, and to the corresponding 
digit of the rubber hand. Similar to non-amputated participants also amputees report 
similar sensations of ownership after synchronous, but not asynchronous stimulation 
(Ehrsson et al., 2008; Rosén et al., 2009; Schmalzl et al., 2011). A case study using 
fMRI suggests that also in these participants a premotor-posterior parietal network is 
activated during the illusion (Schmalzl, Kalckert, Ragnö, & Ehrsson, 2013).  
 
A critical step here is the development of sensory feedback from the prosthesis. 
Sensory feedback is necessary to create a sense of ownership towards the artificial 
limb, but equally important for motor control (Johansson & Flanagan, 2009). Also here 
recent technological advances in providing such tactile feedback offer promising new 
developments (see i.e., Raspopovic et al., 2014), which can lead to a new form of 
prosthetic devices in the not so distant future. Once these technological advances will 
become part of general therapeutic strategies in the care of amputated patients, the 
experience of ownership and agency towards the prosthesis would help the user´s 
overall well being. These experiences might restore a more complete and coherent 
perception of the own body and increase acceptance of the prosthesis (P. Gallagher & 
MacLachlan, 1999).  
 
Similarly the present results could be useful to optimize the sense of ownership and 
agency in virtual-reality to give people simulated limbs and bodies (Slater et al., 2008; 
Slater et al., 2009; Perez-Marcos et al., 2009; Sanchez-Vives et al., 2009). These 
techniques create new avenues in the therapeutic and rehabilitative strategies for 
patients with physical or psychological disorders related to their experience of the body 
or self (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005).  
 
63 
7.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
The present work provides a first attempt to systematically study the problem of bodily 
self-recognition by combining ownership and agency in a single paradigm. The 
combination of both these aspects offers promising new insights into the perceptual 
mechanisms underlying bodily self-recognition. Naturally there is room for 
improvement and refinement of the presented paradigm and several unanswered 
questions to be addressed in the future. 
 
One important question relates to how efference copy mechanisms contribute to the 
ownership sensation. To answer this question we need to explore further potential 
differences between active and passive movements, which is the best and most elegant 
way to disentangle the contribution of afferent and efferent information. An important 
aspect here would be to find a way to perfectly match active and passive movements in 
terms of movement kinematics, considering the manual procedure used in our studies. 
This could be realized by new robotic devices, which are able to copy movement 
parameters from the participant´s hand movements. One other way to address this 
question is also to investigate how processes related to agency, like basic sensorimotor 
control mechanisms, transfer to the rubber hand during the illusion.  
 
Based on our observations we proposed that agency could be differentiated in two 
different types: internal versus external agency. This question is now open for future 
experiments to characterize both these types of agency, and find ways to differentiate 
between agency towards the body and agency towards objects in the external world. 
This might also help to elucidate some of the inconsistencies in the previous literature, 
which often appears unclear in this matter. To this end we are currently preparing an 
experiment, which allows temporal and spatial manipulation of visual feedback of hand 
movements. Given that ownership and agency can be isolated we can create 
experimental situations, in which the participant experiences agency and ownership 
versus situations, when the participant experiences only agency without ownership. 
Thus, it can be directly tested whether temporal thresholds differ in these two contexts.  
 
Related to this is also the need for a robust objective measure of agency that could be 
combined with the presented rubber hand illusion paradigm. It would be interesting to 
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see whether this objective measure would reproduce the observations we have made so 
far by using subjective measures of agency.  
 
Finally, it would be interesting to describe the neural correlates of the moving rubber 
hand illusion. Previous research indicated that a fronto-parietal network is involved in 
the illusory experience of ownership over the rubber hand (Brozzoli et al., 2012; 
Ehrsson et al., 2004; Gentile et al., 2013). This network is also particularly important 
for motor control. This might pose a challenge to disentangle these motor control 
processes and the neural correlates of ownership, while moving a rubber hand that feels 
like your own. The large similarities between moving and classical illusion suggests 
that similar perceptual, and with this possibly similar neural processes underlie the 
illusion.  
 
In conclusion, there are new questions about the nature of ownership and agency, 
which need to be addressed and for which the present work represents a modest attempt 
to achieve some answers. Still there is a good reason to believe that our results 
contribute to our knowledge of the mechanisms underlying bodily self-recognition.  
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